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ABSTRACT 
Article 14 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights recognizes the right 
of every person to seek asylum from persecution in other countries. 
Accordingly, the United Nations adopted the Convention relating to the 
Status of Refugees in 1951. The Convention, in its first article, sets the 
definition of the term refugee. It also establishes a criteria that decision 
makers should follow in order to determine if someone is a refugee. Since 
the implementation of the Convention, writers and practitioners have 
regularly been using an approach that maintains a dichotomy between 
economic migrants and political refugees. This dichotomy is regularly used 
by decision makers to reject entire classes of applicants on the basis that their 
claims reflect economic migrant status rather than refugee status. The current 
situation of global destitution has pushed many people from poor countries 
to flee to more developed countries where they apply for asylum in order to 
find protection. These applicants have started to make claims that have begun 
to challenge the boundaries of the Refugee Convention and question the 
validity of the traditional dichotomy between economic migrants and 
political refugees. This paper identifies the conceptual and analytical 
challenges presented by claims based on economic and social deprivation. It 
assesses how to overcome these challenges by using a creative interpretation 
of the Refugee Convention based on recent developments in international 
human rights law. The central argument of this paper is that in spite of, the 
traditional dichotomy made between economic migrants and political 
refugees by legal scholars, the Refugee Convention is capable of 
accommodating many more claims based on social or economic deprivation. 
To prove this argument, the paper analyzes each element of the refugee 
definition and shows how socio-economic-based claims can fulfill the 
requirements of a refugee claim.  
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I - Introduction     
In the last few decades, the world has witnessed many global crises including wars, 
armed conflicts, revolutions against dictatorial regimes and natural disasters. These 
crises have put millions of people in devastating living conditions of poverty and 
destitution that pushed them to flee their countries and seek asylum in other places in 
the hope of finding peace and protection. These people have been mainly moving from 
poorer countries in the East and South towards more developed and wealthier countries 
in the West and North creating what is currently called “the refugee crisis.”1 The 
phenomenon of refuge from destitution and economic deprivation poses many difficult 
legal and policy challenges for refugee-receiving countries. The main questions raised 
in this context are: How should these countries respond to claims based on economic 
and social deprivation? What are the main international legal principles that could 
constrain the receiving states’ authority in rejecting these claims?  
The 1951 Refugee Convention is regarded as the key instrument in public international 
law for protecting refugees. This Convention articulates the main conditions that must 
be fulfilled in order to recognize someone as a refugee. It also poses many legal 
obligations on state parties regarding the proper treatment asylum-seekers should 
receive during the process of determining their refugee status from the moment they 
reach these states’ lands until they leave it. Since the Refugee Convention was 
implemented, there has been a traditional position in the field which maintains a 
dichotomy between “economic migrants” and “political refugees” the former falling 
outside the application of the convention. Claims based on economic and social 
deprivation have routinely been rejected by many domestic refugee courts in different 
legal systems. They have also been rejected for a long time by the United Nations High 
Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR). Nevertheless, recent developments reflected in 
                                                             
1 This term has been continuously used by many countries and UN agencies to describe the current 
situation of mass displacement of people that caused huge waves of migrants and refugees moving from 
a country to another seeking protection and relief. See, The United Nations, Global Issues: Refugees, 
2019, available at: https://www.un.org/en/sections/issues-depth/refugees/, See also, Care, Global 
Refugee Crisis, 2019, available at: https://www.care.org/emergencies/global-refugee-crisis. I believe that 
the term “crisis” does not properly mirror the current situation taking place in the Mediterranean Sea, 
however, this term has been frequently used by European elites for their own political benefit to 
intimidate and convince their populations that they are under imminent threat from the movements of 
migrants and refugees heading to Europe. The actual crises are taking place in Syria where millions have 
fled their country as a result of war and poverty. Moreover, in Yemen, 24 million have been displaced in 
the last few years because of the Yemeni war. Furthermore, the catastrophic situation of refugees and 
migrants inside Africa as millions of refugees and migrants have been fleeing Burundi, Central African 
Republic, and South Sudan escaping armed conflicts and destitution. 
2 
the literature reveal many scholarly voices arguing against the traditional view that 
adopts this simplistic dichotomy. Moreover, recent case law shows the willingness of 
many courts to consider economic-based claims as falling under the context of the 
Refugee Convention. The question remains at this point is whether economic and social 
deprivation can constitute a valid claim for refugee status or claims must be based on 
civil and political rights violations? 
This question is particularly pressing for three main reasons. First, the last two decades 
have seen significant advances regarding issues related to the interpretation of the 
Refugee Convention, especially, when it comes to the recognition of new claims that 
had rarely been recognized previously. Decision makers have increasingly started to 
accept the integral connection between international refugee law and other fields of law 
such as international human rights law. Such development has expanded the definition 
of the term “refugee” and allowed accommodation of new types of claims previously 
thought to fall outside the Refugee Convention such as claims based on domestic 
violence and female genital mutilation as forms of persecution.2 These advances also 
include economic and social deprivation if proper interpretation and connection can be 
established between both fields of law. Second, these developments in the field of 
international refugee law join with other developments in the field of international 
human rights which recognize economic and social rights as being of equal value and 
importance compared to civil and political rights. Such advances should be examined 
and thoroughly discussed. Third, many commentators have argued that in order for 
socio-economic claims to be recognized, the definition of refugee must be amended, 
re-formulated or a new protocol added to the Refugee Convention recognizing such 
claims.3 Nevertheless, it is rare to find literature uses the definition in its existing form 
and argues that it is capable of responding to these claims by addressing the conceptual 
and theoretical challenges regarding the concept.4  
                                                             
2 See, Deborah Anker, Boundaries in the Field of Human Rights, at 138. 
3 See, for example, Arthur C. Helton and Eliana Jones, ‘What is Forced Migration?’ (1999) 13 
Georgetown 
Immigration Law Journal 521, 526 at 526. 
4 Michelle Foster was one of the first scholars to adopt this idea. In her book, International Refugee 
Law and Socio-Economic Rights: Refuge from Deprivation, Foster gives a very persuasive analysis to 
the Refugee Convention and its ability accommodate new claims based on economic and social 
deprivation.  
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This paper explores the legal challenges created by the phenomenon of refuge from 
destitution and economic deprivation. It engages with the question of whether the 1951 
Refugee Convention in its existing form is capable of recognizing claims based on 
economic and social deprivation. In order to do so, the paper challenges the traditional 
dichotomy between economic migrants and political refugees which has been widely 
accepted by legal scholars and practitioners to date. It argues that the Convention can 
accommodate claims based on economic deprivation with proper interpretation based 
on recent developments in international human rights law. It also identifies the 
conceptual and analytical challenges that may arise from these claims and assesses to 
what extent these challenges can be resolved or overcome via different creative 
interpretations of the Refugee Convention. Moreover, this paper examines each element 
of the refugee definition and the extent to which economic claims can fulfill those 
elements; it follows the same approach used in any refugee status determination 
assessment, which starts by assessing the element of well-founded fear then the element 
of persecution and finally establishes “the causal link” between them and the remaining 
conventional grounds. 
This paper does not engage with the analysis of whether the definition of the term 
“refugee” which is already established in the Refugee Convention should be amended 
or reformulated in order to accommodate new claims based on economic and social 
deprivation. It argues, otherwise, that the definition in its current form is capable of 
absorbing these claims. To establish my claim, this paper examines recent 
developments in the fields of international refugee law and international human right 
law. There are other fields of law that could be relevant to my argument such as 
international treaty law and international migration law, nevertheless, they will not be 
extensively examined in this paper.  
The topic of this paper can be discussed from many angels and perspectives such as the 
pure political analysis which questions how decision makers should engage politically 
with people seeking asylum with claims based only on economic deprivation. 
Development can be another perspective one can use to discuss this topic as many 
literature have engaged with theories about how refugees and migrants should be 
integrated as an important development mechanism receiving states can take advantage 
from. This question has been raised lately in 2018 to elaborate on the decision of 
German chancellor Angela Merkel to accept the resettlement of 10.000 refugees to 
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Germany. Nevertheless, this paper’s scope engages with the question of refugees and 
economic deprivation from a merely legal perspective; it provides a creative 
interpretation to the Refugee Convention and asks for the implementation of this 
interpretation by decision makers in refugee hosting states. The paper can be seen as an 
important reference judges and other legal practitioners which they can use while 
determining refugee status for refugees with economic and social claims. 
This paper in divided into six chapters. Chapter II explores the history of the refugee 
crisis. It indicates the movements of refugees and migrants from the West and South to 
the North and East and the reasons behind these movements. It focuses on the current 
situation of migration through the Mediterranean Sea and how refugee-receiving states 
have dealt with that situation in a way that brought up the use of the term “the boat 
people” to describe the devastating conditions these migrants and refugees face during 
their flight to Europe.  Following, the chapter elaborates on the situation of poverty in 
the world. It establishes a logical relationship between the rates of poverty in some 
countries and the numbers of people displaced in these countries in order to show how 
destitution and economic deprivation are the main motives behind the huge movements 
of refugees and migrants we are witnessing today.  
Chapter III provides the legal framework governing the definition of refugee. It starts 
with explaining the traditional dichotomy between economic migrants and political 
refugees. Following, it explores various legal definitions under international law such 
as migrant, refugee, voluntary migration and involuntary migration. The chapter also 
describes the process of refugee status determination (RSD) which is conducted by 
domestic refugee courts and the UNHCR to determine whether a person should be 
considered as a refugee. Finally, it explores the inclusion criteria for refugee status 
consisting of the elements of the refugee definition such as alienage, well-founded fear, 
persecution and the five conventional grounds. 
Chapter IV elaborates the reasonableness of taking international human rights law as 
an appropriate framework for interpreting the Refugee Convention. It first explores 
recent literature calling for a more objective and universal standard for interpreting the 
Refugee Convention. It then argues that international human rights law is the most 
appropriate standard to be adopted for interpretation. The last section of this chapter 
explores the situation of economic and social rights in the field of international human 
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rights law. It elaborates on traditional views which categorize rights and put civil and 
political rights at a higher level than social and economic rights. Two of these 
approaches are examined at the end of this chapter: Carlier’s hierarchal approach and 
Hathaway core obligation approach.  
Chapter V challenges the legitimacy of putting rights into hierarchies by exploring 
recent developments in the human rights field that has proved that all rights should be 
treated equally and considered on the same level. It then analyzes the main elements of 
the refugee definition and to what extent economic and social deprivation can be a valid 
claim for refugee status. It argues that socio-economic right violations could amount to 
persecution by presenting recent developments in the field and reflected in the literature 
that support this argument. Moreover, it establishes the causal link between economic 
persecution and the five conventional grounds and how recent developments in the field 
of international human rights law have allowed many courts to invent new grounds 
based on economic and social deprivation. 
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II – Background 
A. Brief History of Global Politics and its relation to the Movements of Refugees 
and Migrants  
In the last century, refugees and migrants have taken much of the global attention. 
International disasters have led to devastating outcomes; two world wars resulted in the 
killing of millions of civilians, and internal armed conflicts have led millions to flee 
their homes with their relatives to find a safe place to live.  In addition, Natural disasters 
have forcibly displaced huge numbers of people to different areas of their home 
countries and led others to leave for other countries. Altogether, dictators ruling poor 
countries has caused major violations of people’s fundamental rights, which have left 
them no option but to seek the protection of other countries. 
For the past two centuries, the West has directed its attention to the east and the south: 
They recognize that in order to maintain their wealth they need to take natural resources 
from other countries that do not have the military or political capacity to defend 
themselves. They take such resources in return for providing protection to those 
countries. When these resources have moved north and west, the countries of the east 
and the south fell into extreme poverty and destitution.5 Furthermore, dictators who 
used to ease the process of shifting resources to the West have oppressively ruled the 
people of their countries and committed major massacres against those who tried to 
oppose them. They made sure to maintain security in their countries by oppressing 
people and force them to stay silent.  
This all has led to massive movements of populations around the globe. These 
movements or flows - as some writers call them – have alerted wealthier countries that 
these flows will be heading toward them, which is actually what has happened.  
In 2017, the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) issued a 
shocking report determining the numbers of people displaced worldwide.6 This report 
states that there are more than 68.5 million forcibly displaced persons around the globe; 
25.4 million are refugees who fall under the mandate of UNHCR and UNRWA, 3.1 
                                                             
5 See Beckett J. “Creating Poverty” Hoffmann and Orford (ed.s) The Oxford Handbook of International 
Legal Theory (2016), p 5. In this article Beckett illustrates how far the North and West have always 
depended on East and South resource flows to make their development. He also argues that Public 
International Law was structured in a way that ‘incentivizes’ this process and the creation of poverty. 
See also, Beckett J. The Deceptive Dyad.  
6 UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), Global Trends: Forced Displacement in 2017, 19 
June 2017, available at: https://www.refworld.org/docid/5b2d1a867.html . 
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million are still seeking asylum and not yet granted refugee status, while 40 million are 
internally displaced in their home countries.7 The report points out that the majority of 
refugees come mainly from five countries: Syria, Afghanistan, South Sudan, Myanmar 
and Somalia and that is due to the crisis these countries are going through in recent 
years.8 
Additionally, the International Organization for Migration (IOM) issued its global 
report in 2018 indicating that latest statistics estimate the number of migrants around 
the world to be over 244 million, which is 3.3% of the world’s population.9 The same 
organization indicated in its report in 2000 that the total number of migrants was around 
155 million people, which means that in the last 18 years the number of migrants has 
increased by 89 million.10 There are various reasons for the migration stated in these 
and other reports: There are two main categories: push and pull factors. Push factors 
for migration include violence and war, poverty, unemployment, natural disasters and 
family separation. Pull factors are things as seeking safety and freedom, jobs, food 
availability, family reunification and a better quality of life.11 From those categories, 
we can find two main kinds of migration, voluntary migration through which the person 
seeks a higher quality of life and involuntary migration in which the person is forced to 
leave the country of habitual residence. 
B- The Boat People and the Situation of Refugees in the Mediterranean Sea 
The current situation taking place in the Mediterranean Sea has grabbed the attention 
of the whole world. Hundred thousands of refugees and migrants have been trying to 
cross the sea to Europe through boats, risking their and their families’ live. This has 
created a new crises for refugees and migrates who are seeking international 
protection. The stories of these migrants and refugees are symbols of the injustice 
world we are living in today.  
The term “boat people” originally referred to the thousands of Vietnamese who fled 
their country by sea following the collapse of the South Vietnamese government in 
                                                             
7 Id. 
8 Id. 
9 International Organization for Migration (IOM), World Migration Report 2018, 2018, available at: 
http://www.iom.int/wmr/world-migration-report-2018. 
10 Id. 
11 Justice For Immigrants, Root Causes of Migration, February 2014, Available at: 
https://justiceforimmigrants.org/what-we-are-working-on/immigration/root-causes-of-migration/.  
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1975. The escaped in small vessels with no protection or arms leaving them prey to 
pirates. During this time, many suffered from dehydration, starvation, and death by 
drowning. Since then, the term has been applied to the waves of refugees who have 
attempted to reach the United States by boat from Cuba and Haiti and also to Afghan 
and other refugees seeking asylum in Australia. After more than 40 years, the crisis 
remains ongoing but this time in the Mediterranean Sea.  
According to UNHCR, in only the last five years, nearly two million refugees and 
migrants have arrived in European lands by boats through the Mediterranean Sea. Most 
of them have arrived in Italy, Cyprus and Malta.12 These figures show that in 2015 a 
refugee crisis was occurring, as in one year more than a million refugee and migrant 
had reached Europe.13 That happened before the European Union in 2016 started to take 
actions imposing restrictions on the arrivals and making deals with countries such as 
Turkey, Morocco, Libya and Egypt to regulate migration flows and raise security 
restrictions on the irregular migration.14 According to UNHCR statistics, in those five 
years and around 18000 people had died or were still missing while attempting to cross 
the Mediterranean Sea during the process of their migration.15  
The current situation of refugees, asylum seekers and migrants in Italy is devastating 
and is getting worse day-by-day. The International Organization of Migration (IOM) 
announced that according to available statistics, more than 2000 migrants died from 
drowning in the Mediterranean Sea while they were heading to Italy in 2017. It was 
predicted that this number would rise in 2018 and it did.16 The main reason behind this 
crisis is the new procedures the Italian government has started to take against migrants. 
In November 2018, the Italian government ordered the seizure of the migrant rescue 
ship Aquarius. The ship had joined in many successful operations of rescuing migrants 
and refugees from drowning into the sea. The government claimed that the clothes worn 
by migrants on their voyage from Libya to Italy could have been contaminated by HIV, 
                                                             
12 The Guardian, What is the current state of the migration crisis in Europe?, November 2018, available 
at: https://www.theguardian.com/world/2018/jun/15/what-current-scale-migration-crisis-europe-future-
outlook. 
13 Id. 
14 Reliefweb, European Leaders Pursue Migration Deals with North African Countries, Sparking 
Concerns about Human Costs, December 2017, available at: 
https://reliefweb.int/report/world/european-leaders-pursue-migration-deals-north-african-countries-
sparking-concerns-about.  
15 UNHCR, Operational Portal of Refugee Situation, Mediterranean Situation, available at: 
https://data2.unhcr.org/en/situations/mediterranean. 
16 Supra note 7. 
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meningitis and tuberculosis and that it took such procedures to protects its citizens from 
these dangers.17 The ship was operated by Médecins Sans Frontières (MSF) and SOS 
Méditerranée, both charity organizations who had played a pivotal role in the rescue of 
refugees and migrants in the past decade. The seizure of the ship was not the only 
sanction that has been imposed. Furthermore, 24 people from the team working on the 
ship were prosecuted by the Italian Prosecution, MSF was fined nearly a half million 
euros for their operations and their bank accounts and frozen in Italy upon such 
charges.18  
In 2015, Sergio Mattarella was elected president of the Italian Republic with the support 
from right and mid-right wing parties. Since then, Matarella has openly declared new 
policies to be applied against refugees and migrants reaching the Italian shores through 
the Mediterranean Sea. Such policies have extended to procedures taken by the Italian 
navy and border guards to push back numerous migrants rescue vessels back to sea and 
stand as an obstacle against them reaching their destination. In February 2017, the 
Italian government signed an agreement with the Libyan government, endorsed by the 
other European Leaders, to train, equip and finance the Libyan coastguard in return for 
their support in combatting irregular migration –essentially– to stop vessels before 
reaching the Italian shores.  
This agreement has been taken seriously by Libya to the extent that after several 
months, thousands of migrants and asylum seekers have been detained in detention 
camps designated only for irregular migrants under inhumane conditions. UNHCR and 
IOM have been struggling to reach such detainees and evacuate them after several 
agreements with the Libyan government.19 UNHCR specifically, has released different 
statements condemning the actions carried against the asylum seekers heading to Libya 
and putting the responsibility on both Italian and Libyan governments.20 
                                                             
17 The Guardian, Italy orders seizure of migrant rescue ship over 'HIV-contaminated' clothes, 
November 2018, available at: https://www.theguardian.com/world/2018/nov/20/italy-orders-seizure-
aquarius-migrant-rescue-ship-hiv-clothes.  
18 Id. 
19 The Guardian, Deaths at sea expose flaws of Italy-Libya migration pact, July 2018, available at: 
https://www.theguardian.com/world/2018/jul/23/mother-and-child-drown-after-being-abandoned-off-
libya-says-ngo. 
20 UNHCR, UNHCR evacuates vulnerable refugees out of Libya as fighting resumes, October 2018, 
available at: https://www.unhcr.org/news/press/2018/10/5bc8494b4/unhcr-evacuates-vulnerable-
refugees-libya-fighting-resumes.html.  
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Such a pact has led several victims and survivors to file numerous cases against the 
Italian government before the European Court of Human Rights (ECHR) alleging that 
this agreement had stopped them from reaching Italy and seeking asylum there and 
forcing them to return to Libya against their will where they have been subjected to 
inhumane conditions, beatings, rape and starvation.21 
Such policies reached their peak in 2018 when Matteo Salvini took office as Italy’s 
interior minister. Salvini was the first official to shamelessly declare that Italy would 
no longer commit to its obligations towards refugees and migrants. In one of his 
speeches he boldly stated: Open doors in Italy for good people and a one-way ticket for 
those who come to Italy to create commotion and think they will be taken care of. ‘Send 
them home’ will be one of our top priorities.22 
The problematic issue in Salvini’s statements in my point of view is not that his 
declaring to push away migrants and refugees and going against the non-refoulement 
principle, the refugee convention and other human rights instruments, rather, main 
problem is that during his speeches he insisted on drawing a distinction between 
migrants and refugees, claiming that almost all the people held back in Libya and other 
North African countries are actually economic migrants whom if let into Italy they 
would take the place of other vulnerable “political refugees” who deserve protection. 
Such falsehoods spread by the Italian media have led to the Italian public negative 
opinion towards the idea of offering refuge and state protection. This has pushed several 
human rights organizations such as Girasoli to issue statements sympathizing with the 
public while condemning the Italian public policy; for instance Calogero Santoro the 
head of Girasoli stated: “Fake news about migrants have spread all over Italy during 
the last campaign. My concern is the future of asylum seekers, people who are eligible 
for refugee status. What will happen to them under [Salvini’s] League?”23 
                                                             
21 Queen Mary University of London News, Italy’s deal with Libya regarding migrant ‘pull-backs’ 
faces legal challenge, May 2018, available at: https://www.qmul.ac.uk/media/news/2018/hss/italys-
deal-with-libya-regarding-migrant-pull-backs-faces-legal-challenge.html. 
22 Al Jazeera, What's next for Italy's immigrants under the populist government?, June 2018, available 
at: https://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/features/italy-immigrants-populist-government-
180603130547425.html.  
23 The Irish Times, Italy vows to send home undocumented immigrants, June 2018, available at: 
https://www.irishtimes.com/news/world/europe/italy-vows-to-send-home-undocumented-immigrants-
1.3517841.  
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Moreover, other North African countries have joined the agreements with the EU to 
crackdown on flows of refugees heading to Europe; Spain and Algeria, for instance, 
have made an agreement whereby Algeria would make a concerted efforts to establish 
camps for refugees and migrants trying to use its domestic waters to reach Spain and 
other European countries.24 In exchange, Spain would give economic support to raise 
the efficiency of the Algerian coast guards and to build those camps intended to receive 
large numbers of refugees and migrants.25 Many human rights organizations have 
indicated the mass violations Algeria has committed towards refugees and migrants in 
the past few years. Beside arresting and detaining people who try to cross to Europe 
and send them to camps in remote areas where they face inhumane and degrading 
treatment by police authorities, Algerian police round up sub-Saharan migrants in 
streets and deport them back to their countries and other countries such as Niger and 
Mali.26 Since 2015, Algeria has repatriated more than 27000 sub-Saharan refugees and 
migrants to their home countries and to other countries of asylum. Most of those 
refugees have received ill-treatment, and faced violence, and many have been killed 
during this process.27  
The crisis of refugees in the Mediterranean Sea has become much broader and more 
devastating than can be imagined. The Italian stance I previously explained is just one 
of many contributing factors in such a crisis. The UNHCR has recently published its 
latest report observing the crisis from different perspectives. 28 It has stressed in several 
parts of its report that these flows of refugees would never stop until countries meet 
their obligations towards international human rights law.29  It identifies poverty as one 
of the root causes of the crisis. It indicates that nearly all asylum-seekers heading to 
Europe are from four African countries: Eritrea, Congo, Sudan and Nigeria since those 
countries all have gone through severe economic crises that have left thousands of 
                                                             
24 Reliefweb, Spain and Algeria agree on joint migration crackdown, while at Algeria’s southern border 
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27 European Council on Refugees and Exiles, Algeria: mass deportations of African migrants, March 
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28 UNHCR, Desperate Journeys: Refugees and migrants arriving in Europe and at Europe's borders 
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29 Id at 11. 
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internally displaced persons that moved internally and others who have left to 
neighboring countries in order to escape poverty and find humane living conditions.  
Looking at the statistics one can easily notice that the number of refugees and migrants 
heading to Europe are increasing year-by-year regardless of the increasing deaths risks 
through traveling by sea because of the new restrictions and procedures taken by 
European states. It is obvious that the deteriorating human conditions such as the lack 
of water, food, shelter, healthcare, education, and occupation in several African 
countries have pushed masses of citizens to prefer risking their lives than slowly dying 
of hunger and destitution. 
IOM in its latest report has indicated how poverty and socio-economic rights violations 
have always been the main root causes for migration especially mixed migration which 
means that the flows of migrants are influenced by multiple drive.30 It explains the role 
of economic rights violations in pushing people to leave their countries and head for 
other countries where can they hope to find better living conditions.31 What is 
interesting in this report is that it indicates from various perspectives how motives of 
migration and persecution can intersect. It is commonly found that political upheavals, 
tribal and ethnic tensions, religious extremism, internal armed conflicts, and serious 
violations of civil and political rights are commonly accompanied by serious socio-
economic rights violations as well. This intersectionality highlights how difficult it is 
to distinguish between “pure” economic claims from “civil and political” claims.  
C- The Situation of Poverty in the World with Focus on Africa 
In this part, I would give an overview of the situation of poverty in the world with a 
focus on the poverty rates in Africa. I should also present some statistics regarding the 
annual death rate for people living in extreme poverty and destitution who die for the 
reason that the devastating living conditions resulted from the lack of food, clean water, 
health care, education and shelter. My main focus will be on Africa in order to analyze 
a prime reason for the immense waves of migration and refuge that is hitting Europe 
through the Mediterranean Sea. I believe this part is inseparable to my paper and 
essential in order to have a clear image of the situation of population movements around 
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the world and give another perspective of how Socio-Economic violations can lead to 
shocking outcomes.  
According to recent statistics published by the World Bank, more than 10 percent of 
the world’s population are living in extreme poverty which is less than 1.90 USD a 
day.32 It is important to mention that the 1.9 dollar line has been drawn by The World 
Bank depending on the concept of the Purchasing Power Parity (PPP) which sets the 
currency baseline depending on the baskets of goods and services. The determination 
of this poverty line depends mostly on the price of services which are not commonly 
available to the poor in countries we would focus on, which renders this standard 
arbitrary and does not reflect the actual situation of poverty.33 
In 2015, the number of people living in destitution had reached 736 million people 
including 47 million living in East Asia, 7 million in Europe and Central Asia and 413 
million living in Sub-Saharan Africa which is Africa. It is clear from the statistics that 
more than half of the people living in extreme poverty are from Africa.34 Focusing on 
a few African countries, we can see that the statistics are remarkably shocking; for 
instance, in Nigeria, with a total population of 196 million, the amount of people living 
in extreme poverty exceeds 92 million which is nearly the half of the population. In the 
Democratic Republic of Congo, the total number population is around 83 million, with 
nearly 60 million living in extreme poverty which is 71.5% of the population. In Sudan, 
there are about 10 million Sudanese citizens living in destitution. Eritrea is not any 
better than its fellow African countries, as nearly 40% percent of its population are 
living in extreme poverty that is nearly 2.2 million citizens.35 Other African countries 
face similar statistics. Africa has the highest poverty rates even compared to Asia which 
has a larger population rates and number of natural disasters and South America which 
has similar security and armed conflict conditions.  
In the unfair world we are live in today more than 830 million are chronically 
undernourished, and 1.1 billion do not have access to safe water and 2.6 billion lack 
                                                             
32 The World Bank, Understanding Poverty, 2019, available at: 
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access to basic sanitation.36 Furthermore, around 2 billion people which is nearly one 
third of the total world population lack access to essential drugs, 1 billion have no 
adequate shelter and 2 billion do not have electricity. Over 790 million adults are 
illiterate which increases the percentage of unemployment and increases the crime rate. 
The statistics are worse for children. More than 250 million children around the world 
between the ages of 5 and 14 do wage work with 8.4 million being in “unconditionally 
worst” forms of child labor that involve slavery, forced recruitment in armed conflicts, 
forced labor, forced prostitution and pornography.  
Moreover, statistics show that poverty kills more than 18 million people annually which 
is more than one third of all human deaths. Those deaths are easily avoidable through 
better nutrition, clean water and better healthcare.37 That amounts to 300 million deaths 
in the last 17 years, which exceeds the number of deaths caused by wars, civil wars, 
and government repression. It also shows how important economic and social rights are 
if compared to civil and political rights. Recent reports have suggested that more than 
2.5 million people die every year in Africa due to lack of health care. Most of them are 
preventable through public health intervention.38 Food is another disaster. Nearly 9 
million people die every year of hunger, which means that every hour more than 1000 
people die from lack of food.39 What is also striking is that children suffer the most in 
this equation with more than 3 million deaths every year.40 Africa is on the top when it 
comes to the number of people dying from starvation as more than 333.2 million people 
are living in severe food insecurity.41  
D- Socio-Economic Rights in Refugees Countries of Origin 
There is a connection between the economic and social rights conditions of states and 
the number of people seeking protection in other states which explains the huge waves 
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of refugees and migrants heading to Europe. In the next part I will give a brief summary 
of the situation of human rights in Eritrea and Congo with a focus on economic rights, 
so you can see how such violations can affect people, pushing them to flee their 
countries.  
In Eritrea for instance, recent reports show that beside massive civil and political rights 
violations, Eritreans have been subjected to significant violations of their economic and 
social rights. It has been reported that citizens have been living under very harsh 
economic conditions during the last years, with high poverty rates and low standards of 
living young Eritreans are forced to work for the state according to military service 
rules. All males from the ages of 18 to 50 are eligible for military or “national” service. 
This service consists of six months for military training and a year for development 
projects conducted by the state.42 After service comes to an end, the state has the right 
to re-recruit any person into the military for long periods and oblige him or her to work 
on industrial or agricultural projects for the state with very low wages.43 Furthermore, 
the healthcare conditions in Eritrea have been deteriorating for decades; many Eritreans 
are infected with diseases and the healthcare system is not sufficiently protect all 
citizens.44 
Like Eritrea, the Democratic Republic of Congo has witnessed one of the largest 
humanitarian crises in Africa in the past few years. With bloody political oppression, 
more than 140 active armed groups and very deteriorating living conditions, more than 
4.5 million Congolese were displaced from their homes and more than 130.000 people 
have fled the country seeking protection and refuge in other countries.45 Beside the 
political and civil aspects of oppression, it is important to mention that Congo is one of 
the poorest nations of Africa; regardless being one of the richest countries with natural 
sources, more than 70% of the nation are living below poverty line.46 Congo’s 
Education conditions are also deteriorating; 3.5 million children of primary school age 
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do not attend schools.47 In terms of healthcare, the Congolese government has paid little 
attention to it; epidemics have grossly spread in the country and many deadly diseases 
have been neglected resulting in thousands of deaths every year.48 
As we have seen, the situation of refugees and migrants crossing to Europe through the 
Mediterranean Sea is very devastating as European states have used North African 
countries to stay as an obstacle before those refugees apprehending them from reaching 
European shores. This has resulted to mass violations to the rights of those refugees. 
Furthermore, the connection between the numbers of people fleeing to Europe and the 
situation of poverty in the world have been established to prove that these people fleeing 
their countries are mostly escaping death of poverty and destitution. The next chapter 
will look at the legal framework of refugee and migration conventions, and the 
definitions of many legal terms such as migrant, refugee, voluntary and involuntary 
migration. The process of refugee status determination is also explained showing how 
complicated it is to determine if asylum seekers should be recognized as refugees or 
not.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                             
47 USAID, Democratic Republic of Congo: Education, February 2018, available at: 
https://www.usaid.gov/democratic-republic-congo/education . 
48 Medecins Sans Frontieres, Democratic Republic of Congo: Condition still critical, November 2011, 
available at: https://www.msf.org/democratic-republic-congo-condition-still-critical . 
17 
III - The International Legal Framework Governing the Distinction between 
Refugees and Migrants 
A. The Dichotomy between ‘Migrant’ and ‘Refugee’ under Public Policy  
States policies have underpinned the rejection of entire classes of applicants on the basis 
that their claims are of an economic nature rather than a political. The first are seen as 
economic migrants not refugees, and as a result they are entirely prohibited from 
seeking asylum in these states. For instance, the US policy towards Haitians fleeing in 
the 1980s saw them are economic migrants and not political refugees.49 Moreover, the 
repatriation of Vietnamese refugees by Hong Kong in the 1980s was based on the same 
assumption.50 Moreover, the decision of China to return thousands of North Koreans 
with an agreement concluded with their government for being economic migrants.51 
Modern history has many more examples for states denying refuge for entire classes of 
people depending on the assumption that they are economically motivated.  
In the past few years, the same argument has been used repeatedly against refugees, for 
example: in 2016 Frans Timmermans, the EU Vice President has claimed that 60 
percent of the migrants who come to Europe are coming for economic reasons and then 
they are not considered refugees under international refugee law.52 In Italy, the new 
government has decided to deport more than 500.000 people claiming that they are 
migrants with ‘economic reasons’ and not refugees, so the Italian government has the 
right to deport them back to their home countries.53 While in the US, President Donald 
Trump has threatened to prosecute migrants coming from Mexico, he claims that the 
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flows coming to the US consists of economic migrants and once they pass the borders 
they become irregular migrants and the government has the right to prosecute them.54 
In the world we are living in today, many western countries have been repeatedly trying 
to find an escape from their obligations under international refugee law in order to be 
able to stop such flows of people from reaching their lands. The media in western 
refugee-receiving countries has been intimately fighting to prove the existence of the 
dichotomy between economic migrants and refugees; they do so in order to impose 
tougher measures against asylum seekers with economic and social claims. 
This debate going around the world on whether the waves of people crossing to Europe 
through the Mediterranean Sea are migrants or refugees and whether states are obliged 
to protect them or have the right to just return them is a fervent debate. Some policy 
makers have insisted that they are migrants so according to international law there is no 
legal obligation to harbor them, others contend that they are refugees and they should 
be protected and if not it would be a gross violation to international refugee law.  
At the same time media platforms have struggled with whether to call them refugees or 
migrants, UNHCR published an article asking governments and media to be careful 
while using both expressions when referring to the waves heading to Europe. It prefers 
to call them “groups of refugees and migrants,” as it is impossible to affirm which group 
they may be part of. People who join those waves, may have mixed motives for leaving 
their countries. They are escaping persecution, wars, armed conflicts, natural disasters, 
and many other reasons.55   
As highlighted by the UNHCR, it is impossible to assert whether a group of people are 
migrants or refugees, to do so, it requires subjecting these people to an exceedingly 
long process to determine their eligibility for refugee status under international refugee 
law. In the next section the legal definitions of refugee and migrant terms are presented 
to show how blurred the distinction is. Then in the last part, the process of refugee status 
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determination under the practice of UNHCR and other regional refugee courts is 
discussed.  
B. Legal Definitions: Refugees vs. Migrants 
In this section I will discuss in detail the legal definition of the terms refugee and 
migrant under international law. I will examine different legal instruments and their 
definition to these terms in order to prove how complex the situation could be in order 
to determine whether the person is a migrant and deserves refugee status or a migrant 
that should follow migration procedures. This complexity would help to pave the way 
before challenging the traditional dichotomy between the terms.  
1. The Definition of the Term ‘Refugee’   
There is no unanimous definition for the term ‘refugee’ among states. This term has 
been defined by different international and national legal instruments, such as the 1951 
Refugee Convention, the Organization of African Unity (OAU) Convention and the 
Cartagena Declaration.  
Article 1 A (2) of the 1951 Refugee Convention defines the refugee as:  
A person who, “owing to well-founded fear of being persecuted for reasons of race, 
religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or political opinion, is 
outside the country of his nationality and is unable or, owing to such fear, is unwilling 
to avail himself of the protection of that country; or who, not having a nationality and 
being outside the country of his former habitual residence as a result of such events, is 
unable or, owing to such fear, is unwilling to return to it.”56 This convention is 
considered by many scholars and practitioners as the cornerstone of the international 
refugee law, it is signed and ratified by 146 states around the world, and have been used 
as the main guideline for the UNHCR and many refugee courts in determining refugee 
status. 
The Organization of African Unity adopted the 1969 Refugee Convention, known as 
the OAU Convention, which extends the definition set by the 1951 Refugee Convention 
by adding that: 
“The term "refugee" shall also apply to every person who, owing to external aggression, 
occupation, foreign domination or events seriously disturbing public order in either part 
or the whole of his country of origin or nationality, is compelled to leave his place of 
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habitual residence in order to seek refuge in another place outside his country of origin 
or nationality.”57 
Alike the OAU Convention, the 1984 Cartagena Declaration extends more in the 
definition of refugee, it states that refugees also include persons who flee their country 
"because their lives, security or freedom have been threatened by generalized violence, 
foreign aggression, internal conflicts, massive violations of human rights or other 
circumstances which have seriously disturbed public order."58  
It is clear from the above-mentioned different definitions to the term “refugee” from 
three different refugee conventions that there is no unanimous definition for such term, 
it is the state responsibility to decide whether to extend the umbrella of protection to 
include new groups of refugees or to use the narrow approach for defining this term.  
2. The Definition of the Term ‘Migrant’   
While there is also no clear definition of the term ‘migrant, International Organization 
of Migration defines the term migrant as 
“Any person who is moving or has moved across an international border or 
within a State away from his/her habitual place of residence, regardless of (1) 
the person’s legal status; (2) whether the movement is voluntary or involuntary; 
(3) what the causes for the movement are; or (4) what the length of the stay 
is.”59 
The United Nations, on the other hand, defines the term as “An individual who has 
resided in a foreign country for more than one year irrespective of the causes, voluntary 
or involuntary, and the means, regular or irregular, used to migrate.”60 The two 
definitions seems to be very extensive and blur, as they did not identify the main reasons 
behind immigration, or even set a distinction between voluntary and involuntary 
migration. 
The UNHCR has highlighted in its guidelines how the distinction between the terms 
“migrant” and “refugee” is blurred as the examination of many cases has indicated that 
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mostly the economic measures states are taking against individuals, can be directed to 
them based on racial, religious, political or political discrimination which could amount 
to persecution under the definition of the 1951 Refuge Convention. Therefore, it defines 
the term ‘migrant’ simply to be,  
“[A] person who, for reasons other than those contained in the definition, 
voluntarily leaves his country in order to take up residence elsewhere. He may 
be moved by the desire for change or adventure, or by family or other reasons 
of a personal nature. If he is moved exclusively by economic considerations, he 
is an economic migrant and not a refugee.”61 
By doing so, the guidelines restricts the application of the definition of migrant to only 
voluntary reasons, it disregarded the situation by which a person can involuntarily leave 
his country, that is because involuntary migration and refuge are very similar in many 
aspects. In addition, it stresses that a migrant is that person whose motives are only 
economical, so those with mixed motives cannot be regarded as migrants.  
From the previous definitions set by international instruments, it is clear that both terms 
intersect in several aspects. The criteria for determining a refugee is immensely 
complicated and has a set of condition the applicant must satisfy in order to recognize 
as a refugee. Even within international instruments, there are some variations, for 
instance, the OAU Convention and the Cartagena Declaration set broader definition 
than that mentioned in the 1951 Refugee Convention in order to include more asylum-
seekers and recognize them as refugees.  
On the other hand, international instruments define the term ‘migrant’ in a broader 
sense it includes every person who is fleeing his or her country of origin or the country 
of habitual residence for various reasons. Some of them are beyond the individuals will, 
while others are by his own free will.  
The main difference between both terms is that according to International law, states 
are obliged to accept asylum-seekers who have refugee claims to cross their borders. 
States must also take all necessary measures to protect those refugees and refrain from 
returning them back to their home countries. While for migrants, states have the right 
to impose their own migration policies, which mostly impose restrictions like visa 
procedures and security check. To sum up, in the case of refugees states are obliged to 
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accept and protect them, while in case of migrants, states have the right to reject them 
for different reasons depending on their own policies. 
3. Voluntary Migration vs. Involuntary Migration 
The International Organization of Migration has formulated a clear definition for the 
term “voluntary migration” which depends more on defining the other type on 
“involuntary migration or forced migration.” And that any migrant who does not fall 
under such a category is deemed to be voluntarily migrating. With a simplified 
definition of voluntary migration may posit that it is the action whereby migrants have 
the free choice whether to migrate or not. In this type, people mostly choose to migrate 
to enhance their living conditions, financial capabilities and social class in the country 
they are migrating to. We can also find an equivalent definition to the term “voluntary 
migrant” in the general definition IOM proposes for the term ‘migrant,’ as it states 
“The term migrant is usually understood to cover all cases where the decision 
to migrate was taken freely by the individual concerned for reasons of “personal 
convenience” and without intervention of an external compelling factor; it 
therefore, applie[s] to persons, and family members, moving to another country 
or region to better their material or social conditions and improve the prospect 
for themselves or their family.”62 
The tricky word in this definition is the word “freely.” How can we know if the choice 
was freely taken or the migrant had no other option to choose from? Is the choice a 
subjective matter that depends on the feelings of the migrant? Is not the state of fear 
different from one person to another? There are countless other questions regarding the 
definition of voluntary migration academics have been asking for the decades, however, 
until now there has been no consensus on how to define the word “voluntary.”63  
Furthermore, the IOM has tried to define the term ‘Involuntary Migration / Forced 
Migration in its glossary. The definition the Organization has proposed is not as clear 
as we can expect as it depends on a subjective element which cannot be clearly defined 
or educed. It defines it as:  
“A migratory movement in which an element of coercion exists, including 
threats to life and livelihood, whether arising from natural or man-made causes 
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(e.g. movements of refugees and internally displaced persons as well as people 
displaced by natural or environmental disasters, chemical or nuclear disasters, 
famine, or development projects).”64 
Many academics talk about voluntary and involuntary migrants as separate categories. 
They start with the theory of “voluntariness” and when a person is voluntarily migrating 
to another land or is forced to do so.65 Other distinguished academics have insisted that 
it is impossible to recognize both categories as clearly. They prefer to call the waves 
heading to Europe as “mixed migration” as people may have mixed motives that drive 
them to leave their countries. Some of those motives are purely voluntary, others purely 
involuntary and some are mixed between both.66 The theory of ‘voluntariness’ has been 
argued among writers; some of them have taken the expansive view while others have 
adopted a narrower interpretation depending on their humanitarian view. The expansive 
interpretation which has been adopted by writers such as Katy Long, who follows 
Nozick’s minimalist approach to rights, considers a person free if their minimal rights 
such as the right to life, liberty and property are not threatened but rather protected.67 
Other writers such as Olsaretti argue that freedom and voluntariness do not necessarily 
intersect as “a choice is voluntary when it is made in the context of acceptable 
alternatives or if the lack itself of alternatives is acceptable to the person making the 
choice.”68 
As we can see, there is no consensus among states, institutions and writers on the 
distinction between the terms ‘refugee’ and ‘migrant’ as we can notice the definition 
IOM has adopted to the term ‘migration’ includes refugees and asylum-seekers. 
Furthermore, the definition of ‘forced migration’ is extremely close to the definition of 
the term ‘refuge’ in both people are escaping major events that can threaten their lives, 
liberties or properties. UNHCR itself has indicated in its guidelines that it is so tricky 
and arduous to indicate whether people fleeing to Europe are considered migrants or 
refugees, as to do this the state or the UNHCR should have long individual meetings 
with them and listen to their claims in order to determine their refugee status. In the 
next and final section of this chapter, I will elaborate about the process of refugee status 
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determination (RSD), how it is conducted and conditions that should or should not be 
met for an asylum seeker to be considered as a refugee. 
C- Refugee Status Determination 
According to the 1951 Refugee Convention, states carry the burden of exercising the 
refugee status determination process of asylum seekers calling for their protection. A 
small number of states fulfills their obligation and fully carry out the RSD process while 
others depend on UNHCR to undertake the process and recognize refugees. The RSD 
process is not explicitly stated as one of the roles of the UNHCR under its mandate, 
however, it is implicitly inferred in under Article 8 of the statute.69 Since then, the 
UNHCR has established its own guidelines for status determination which is followed 
by all of its agents and officers worldwide. Those guidelines have also been followed 
by domestic courts in formulating their own guidelines.  
According to UNHCR guidelines, the RSD process has two main stages; the first stage 
is concerned with the facts of the case as claimed by the applicant, while the second 
stage applies the definitions set by the 1951 Refugee Convention and the 1967 Protocol 
to determine the eligibility of the claim for falling under the protection of the 
international refugee law. The second stage is divided into two processes, the inclusion 
process and the exclusion. The inclusion process depends on the inclusion clauses in 
the Refugee Convention and must be satisfied by the applicant to be considered a 
refugee. On the other hand, the exclusion process which is conducted after the 
inclusion, contains the conditions by which if the applicant satisfies any of them he 
should be excluded or the Convention ceases to apply to him. In the next and final part 
of this chapter the Inclusion criteria is discussed.  
1. The Inclusion Criteria for the Refugee Status 
For a person to be recognized as a refugee he must fulfill the criteria set by the 1951 
Refugee Convention, in article 1 (a). The definition of the term ‘Refugee’ in the 
Convention has four elements; the first element in the Alienage element which requires 
the applicant to be outside of his country of origin or habitual residence. Secondly, there 
is the element of the “well-founded fear of being persecuted” and this element is 
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separated into two elements; the fear itself which has a subjective and objective 
perspective and persecution. Most writers consider “persecution” as a separate element 
as it is the hardest element to fulfill in the Refugee criteria. To do so, the actors of the 
persecution –whether state actors, individuals or both – must be determined.  
If the applicant fulfills the first three elements he still has to fulfill the fourth and final 
one which is “the five conventional grounds.” The applicant has to show that he is 
outside of his country because he has a fear of being persecuted, and this persecution 
was directed against him on one or more conventional grounds which are race, religion, 
nationality, membership in a particular social group or political opinion. The four 
elements for determining refugee status are considered the main cornerstones of the 
1951 Refugee Convention. On the surface, they may seem straight forward, but there 
are many different interpretations among scholars, practitioners and courts. In the next 
part, the most common interpretations for each element is presented, in order for us to 
understand the complexity of defining and distinguishing between refugees, migrants 
and others who are not eligible for both statuses. 
a) The Alienage  
The first element of the Refugee criteria is “Alienage.” For a person to be considered a 
refugee, he should be outside of his country of nationality of habitual residence. 
According to UNHCR guidelines, this condition is the first to look for when 
determining refugee status as it notes that, “for a refugee claim being outside the 
country of the claimant nationality is a general requirement and there is no international 
protection for a person as refugee within the jurisdiction of his country of nationality 
or habitual residence.”70 The next three elements follow this element. The applicant’s 
fear of persecution must be connected in one way or another to his country of origin or 
the country of his habitual residence when the first is not determinate.71  
b) Well-Founded Fear 
Well-founded fear is the second element for refugee status determination. It is one of 
the key elements in the definition of Refugee. From the expression itself we can find 
that two parts: the fear of the applicant and that the fear should be well-founded. There 
have been several scholarly interpretations of this element. Most of them have put the 
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process of determining the fear in a bipartite or combined approach. In interpreting the 
term we can find that it contains two main factors: the subjective and the objective. The 
subjective factor of the well-founded fear is the applicant’s state of mind and his or her 
personal experience of fear. It means that the judge or the RSD officer should examine 
the previous experiences the applicant has gone through and how those experiences 
have had an impact on him in a way that put him in a state of fear. The objective factor 
is the availability of information in applicant country of origin that confirms the threats 
the applicant has faced or may face in the future if he returns to his country. The 
UNHCR follows the bipartite or combined approach which necessitates the satisfaction 
of both conditions. This requires introducing the applicant, his family, and relatives’ 
previous experiences that led them to live in fear. Afterward, the available country of 
origin information (COI) proving that the situation in the applicant’s country of origin 
gives rise to a valid fear of staying or returning back to this country.72 
Beside the bipartite or combined approach many scholars posit that only the objective 
element can sufficiently satisfy such an element, creating what is called “the objective 
approach.” Hathaway and Foster for instance have affirmed that the state of mind of 
the applicant should have nothing to do with the objectivity of fear, as “The concept of 
well-founded fear is inherently objective. It denies protection to persons unable to 
demonstrate a real chance of present or prospective persecution, but does not in any 
sense condition refugee status on the ability to show subjective fear.”73 Zimmermann 
agrees with the perspective of Hathaway and Foster, but he sees that the subjective 
factor should be assessed also and should be seen only as an additional factor to the 
objective. That if not satisfied it should not affect the determination of refugee status of 
the applicant.74 
It should be noted that, there is no connection between the well-founded fear of being 
persecuted and the presence of the applicant in his country of origin, which means that 
the fear of persecution may arise while the applicant was outside of his country of 
origin, so there is no legal condition the applicant should have witnessed some events 
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in his country to have a fear of persecution, as Goodwin-Gill indicates in his writings.75 
According to UNHCR, there are several cases in which the applicant legally and 
smoothly leaves his country, afterward, the situations and circumstances of his country 
change in a way that may put his life in a threat if he returns, in this case, the applicant 
will be considered as a “Refugee sur place.”76 
c) Persecution  
Persecution is the third element that must be fulfilled in the process of refugee status 
determination. It is tricky as it has been used to widen or narrow the application of the 
Refugee Convention. There is no universal definition for the term “persecution,” as 
none of the international law instruments – including the 1951 Refugee Convention – 
have explicitly defined it.77 The UNHCR, for instance, in its advisory opinion about 
defining the term ‘refugee’ states that, “the concept of persecution was intentionally not 
defined by the drafters of the 1951 Convention and the drafter’s original intention was 
to allow for a sufficient degree of flexibility in order to encompass all future types of 
persecution by the term.”78  
The UNHCR and various scholars have most commonly used both articles 31 and 33 
of the Refugee Convention to interpret the term, as it refers to persecution as it “is only 
taking place where the applicant's ‘life or freedom’ is being threatened, on account of 
race, religion, nationality, political opinion or membership of a particular social 
group.”79 Furthermore, UNHCR extends this definition to also include any serious 
human rights violation that is based on any of the five conventional grounds.80 
However, we differentiate between the terms ‘persecution’ and ‘discrimination,’ as the 
latter does not always put the person’s life and freedom into a threat, but UNHCR has 
determined that “a persistent pattern of consistent discrimination will amount to 
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persecution on cumulative grounds.”81 It also set a distinguishes between ‘persecution’ 
and ‘prosecution’ as the latter is considered in the application of the penal code in the 
case of committing crimes, however, the prosecution may turn into persecution if laws 
are being applied in a discriminatory manner by the state.82 
Leading scholars and practitioners in the field of International Refugee Law have not 
yet reached a uniform interpretation of the element of persecution. However, most of 
them mainly agree that persecution consists of two major elements; the first element is 
the severe harm or threat, while the second element is the lack of state protection 
regarding this harm. The differences between scholars arise rests on how to identify 
and weigh the harm that may amount to persecution. Zimmermann, for instance, 
suggests that “the notion of ‘persecution’ is interwoven with the protection of human 
rights […] persecution often been referred to as the severe violation of human rights 
accompanied by a failure of the State to protect the individual.”83 Hathaway and Foster 
agree with Zimmermann that persecution requires both serious harm and lack of state 
protection, but Hathaway indicates that the test of “serious harm” requires a violation 
of one or more human rights.84 They both posit in their writing that the ‘human rights 
based approach’ is the only valid approach for interpreting the term “persecution” as 
serious harm generates from human rights violations, so “reliance on international 
human rights law to identify serious harm relevant to finding an individual to be at risk 
of “being persecuted” is both principled and practical.”85 On the other hand we can see 
leading writers such as Goodwin-Gill and Jane McAdam who see relying on 
International Human Rights Law as invalid, as rapid developments in IHRL “take[s] 
the concept of persecution far beyond the grounds spelled out in the Refugee 
Convention.”86 
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d) The Five Conventional Grounds  
The fourth element of the inclusion criteria for refugee status determination is the 
connection between the applicant’s well-founded fear of being persecuted and the five 
conventional grounds stated in Article 1A (2) of the 1951 Refugee Convention. This 
Convention has made this causal link compulsory in order to render a claim of refugee 
status recognizable. It is an important element because most applicants can prove the 
elements of fear and persecution but cannot connect them to the conventional grounds. 
The grounds stated in the Convention are race, religion, nationality, membership of a 
particular social group or political opinion. Thus, the applicant’s fear of the state of 
persecution must happen “for the reason of” one or more of these grounds. As with the 
previous elements the interpretation of this causal link has not been settled by legal 
scholars and practitioners though, there have been several theories presented to interpret 
the term “for reason of.” The UNHCR has adopted an approach called ‘contributing 
clause’ and Michelle Foster follows it as well. This approach means that it is not a must 
that one of the grounds is directly leading the applicant to be persecuted, rather it is 
enough to establish that this ground has contributed to the applicant’s fear of 
persecution.  
Unlike the expansive approach the UNHCR has adopted, some domestic courts and 
writers have followed the “but for test” which is an extremely narrowly structured 
approach. It means that the applicants would not have faced persecution or the threat of 
it “but for” the existence of the conventional ground. In other words, if the applicant is 
from a certain clan and is persecuted and he has a well-founded fear, we can determine 
that “but for” his membership in such a clan, he would not have faced such 
persecution.87 Other writers have adopted the “motivation approach” which means “to 
determine the ‘real motivation for the actions of the persecutor” because the ‘potential 
persecutor intends to harm the applicant on the basis of the applicant’s (real or 
perceived) relationship to one of the 1951 Convention's grounds’.”88 Finally, some 
writers such as Hathaway have adopted the “bifurcated approach” that persecution has 
two elements which are serious harm and failure of state protection, a connection is 
established if at least one of those elements is fulfilled based on the conventional 
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grounds. In other words, if it can be established that the applicant has faced harm 
because of one of the grounds, or even if he has not but the state refuses to protect him 
for a reason based on conventional grounds, the nexus is established.  
As we have seen in this chapter, how complex the process of identifying the person to 
be a refugee or a migrant can be. To do so, I have presented different legal definition 
for both terms which explained the blurred relation between them. In addition, the 
Refugee Status Determination (RSD) which is conducted by refugee courts and 
UNHCR to determine whether the person is considered to be a refugee or not is 
explained. These process to be completed, the applicant must fulfill the four elements 
of the refugee definition, those elements are: alienage, a well-founded fear, persecution 
and the connection of them all to one or more of the five conventional ground which 
are race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or political 
opinion. In the next chapter, the violations of socio-economic rights will be discussed 
and whether they can fall under the context of the International Refugee Convention or 
not.  
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IV - Understanding International Refugee Law under the Framework of 
International Human Rights Law 
In the last decade, international refugee law jurisprudence has evolved to bringing new 
interpretations of the 1951 Refugee Convention. As I mentioned earlier, the Convention 
is silent when it comes to defining some legal terms such as well-founded fear, 
persecution and the five conventional grounds which constitute the main elements of 
the refugee definition. Satisfying these elements set by Art. 1A (2) of the Refugee 
Convention are crucial for determining whether a person should be considered a refugee 
or not. International Refugee Law academics and practitioners have reached different 
interpretations of those terms. Every interpretation relies on a different context. In this 
chapter, my main focus is on the International Human Rights Law approach as it has 
long been debated and contested by different legal scholars. Additionally, it is the most 
appropriate approach for arguing about economic and social rights violations 
amounting to persecution in respect to the Refugee Convention. 
The human rights approach in interpreting the Refugee Convention was first advocated 
by Vernant in 1953. He suggested that the term “persecution” should be interpreted as 
“severe sanctions and measures of an arbitrary nature, incompatible with the principles 
set forth in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights.”89 At the time, Vernant’s 
methodology in interpreting refugee law terms was revolutionary, as he shed the light 
on one of the most important human rights instruments in history – the UDHR– which 
had not yet been recognized as obligatory under customary international law.90  This 
analysis was not widely accepted by the community of international law until 1991, 
when Hathaway presented his analysis which proposed that the term ‘persecution’ is 
best understood as “sustained or systemic violation of basic human rights demonstrative 
of a failure of state protection.”91 He established that in order to understand the 
graveness and seriousness of any harm by amounting to persecution, one should assess 
the harm under the framework of human rights, specifically, under the International Bill 
of Rights consisting of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the International 
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and the International Covenant on Economic, 
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Social and Cultural Rights.92 Hathaway’s interpretation has been deemed very 
progressive by many writers, as it made it easier for the Convention to encompass more 
claims than had ever been recognized by domestic courts. For instance, gender-based 
violence is now recognized by courts and scholars to be considered a form of 
persecution because of the human rights approach which has revealed how much 
women around the world suffer as a result of it.93 Many other commentators and writers 
have joined Hathaway in his interpretation such as Goodwin-Gill,94 Helene Lambert95 
and Jacqueline Bhabha.96 
The human rights standard has not been only used to analyze the term “persecution,” 
but legal scholars and domestic courts have consistently used it to interpret the 
conventional grounds, specially, the “membership of a particular social group” ground. 
For instance, the Federal Court of Australia has considered using Article 16 (3) of the 
Universal Declaration of Human Rights to define the “family” as a particular social 
group under the Refugee Convention.97 In addition, those standards have been used to 
establish whether the applicant’s voluntary acts could give rise to a well-founded fear.98 
Furthermore, they were also used to assess the availability of state protection and the 
availability of an internal flight alternative (IFA) for the applicant whereby he/she can 
be safe from persecution.99 
The UNHCR reflects on the human rights approach in many of its publications and 
guidelines. In its Handbook the connection between human rights violations and 
persecution is established. For instance, in distinguishing between persecution and 
punishment, it stipulates that “recourse may usefully be had to the principles set out in 
the International Covenants on Human Rights, which contain binding commitments for 
the States parties and are instruments to which many States parties to the 1951 
Convention have acceded.”100 The connection was further mentioned in UNHCR 
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Executive Committee Conclusions (ExCom), Guidelines in International Protection 
and many interventions in domestic courts proceedings.101 We can also see The 
Conference of International Refugee Law Judges, in which the Director of International 
Protection has pressed the importance of human rights, stating that “human rights law 
should and must provide the broad and objective indicators against which the term 
“persecution” can be interpreted.”102 It is clear that the UNHCR has decided to take the 
progressive approach held by many scholars and commentators in order to employ a 
more persuasive and clear interpretation of the Refugee Convention.  
A. International Human Rights Law Instruments and Their Connection to 
Refugees  
Over the past two decades, legal scholars have introduced new developments in 
international human rights law, recognizing its efficiency in interpreting the elements 
of the “refugee” definition under the 1951 Refugee Convention. They have tried to 
adopt the human rights-based approach to ensure a more universal and objective 
application of the Convention, which should lead to more uniformity and consistency 
in decision making regarding who qualifies for international protection under refugee 
law.103 Deborah E. Anker for instance is one of the first writers to recognize the 
evolution of international refugee law under the human rights law framework. She 
explains the steps by which international human rights law started to recognize and 
understand “gender-based” persecution, and adopt this analysis in cases of female 
genital mutilation and sexual violence.  
These significant developments that have occurred in the last three decades have 
affected the application of international refugee law.104 For instance, the UNHCR in 
2002 published guidelines regarding gender-based persecution and other refugee claims 
related to this issue.105 It also has published many guidelines relating to female genital 
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mutilation and sexual violence recognizing for the first time those women who are 
subject to such violations to fall under the conventional ground of “particular social 
group.”106 These guidelines are a starting point for many other domestic guidelines 
published by refugee courts and tribunals which recognize such claims as “gender-
based” to fall under the Refugee Convention. This was not the case before the 
developments that took place in the international human rights law field.  
Many scholars have tried to use the same approach to prove that international refugee 
law recognize asylum seekers with claims based on socio-economic persecution. They 
believe that it has become obvious that IHRL now recognizes many violations of social 
and economic rights to be considered as being persecution.  Therefore, adopting the 
human rights framework can lead to the recognition of refugees who have been 
subjected to a severe violation of their rights to food, health, housing, education and 
employment.107  
B. Reasonableness of using the Human Rights Framework to Interpret the 
Refugee Convention 
As we see many legal scholars and commentators have agreed to rely on the human 
rights approach in order to have a better understanding and solid interpretation of the 
legal key terms set by the Refugee Convention. The important question to ask what the 
justification behind choosing an external standard for interpreting the Refugee 
Convention actually is? Jurisprudence including court decisions have indicated that 
although the international treaty is applied domestically, but it must be interpreted as 
“consistently and uniformly as possible.”108 In the case of R v. Secretary of State for 
the Home Department, Lord Steyn explained how courts could have an interpretation 
for the terms of the Refugee Convention, he indicated that, “In practice it is left to 
national courts, faced with material disagreement on an issue of interpretation, to 
resolve it. But in so doing it must search, untrammeled by notion of its national legal 
culture, for the true autonomous and international meaning of the treaty. And there can 
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only be one true meaning.”109 The court also has stated that “the 1951 Refugee 
Convention, like other multilateral treaties, had one true autonomous interpretation 
which must be decided upon as a question of law. In the absence of a ruling from the 
International Court of Justice under Art 38 of the 1951 Refugee Convention, national 
courts had to identify the one true interpretation.”110 In this way, the court has indicated 
that it and other courts should identify the true interpretation for the provisions of the 
Refugee Convention.  
1. To a More Objective and Universal Standard 
Judges have continuously tried to find a more objective standard to interpret the 
Refugee Convention by; many of them have indicated the dangers that can emanate 
from leaving judges to decide whether what the applicant is facing amounts to 
persecution or not based on subjective parameters and based on their own discretionary 
power.111 This objective standard has been explicitly identified by the English Court of 
Appeal in Sepet v. Secretary of State for the Home Department, in which one of the 
judges posited that, “however wide the canvas facing the judge’s brush, the image he 
makes has to be firmly based on some conception of objective principle which is 
recognized as a legitimate source of law.”112 Courts have also emphasized the idea of 
“universal standards,” in other words, looking for the “international meaning” of the 
Refugee Convention.113 The UNHCR has also followed the same path of seeking 
universal rules and norms governing the interpretation of the Refugee Convention and 
governing the process of Refugee Status Determination. As the High Commissioner for 
Refugees has emphasized that “the UNHCR has constantly sought to bring about a 
certain measure of uniformity in the elaboration of eligibility criteria with a view to 
ensuring that all applicants are treated according to the same standards.”114  
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Besides the UNHCR stating an objective standard and universal interpretation would 
serve justice among applicants, courts have given another reason which depends on the 
expected the outcome of the case. In Australia, the Refugee Review Tribunal (RRT) 
has indicated that applicants have the right to foresee the result of their applications. 
This would only happen if judges’ application of law and the interpretation of its 
provisions were consistent and unified. It states that: it is “important that so far as 
possible decision-makers adhere to objective concepts capable of universal application 
and susceptible to the jurisprudence of international bodies, so that uniformity can be 
applied and applicants are able to have a better idea of whether their claims are likely 
to succeed.”115 The use of the objective standard would be more consistent with the 
nature of the principle of refugee as the claims of the asylum-seekers may hugely vary 
from one to another; the kinds of threats they are facing are different; the nature of the 
agents of persecution whether they are states or individuals are not the same, and the 
fear they have to stay or to return to their countries is based on their background and 
the cultures they come from.  
Unlike most domestic courts and dominant jurisprudence adopting the objective view, 
the US jurisprudence eschews it and instead uses a more subjective perspective. It is 
clear from its decisions that it depends more on vague and flexible terms to interpret 
the term “persecution.” For instance, the Ninth Circuit in 1998 defined persecution to 
be “the infliction of suffering or harm upon those who differ (in race, religion or 
political opinion) in a way regarded as offensive,”116 On the other hand, the Seventh 
Circuit later in 2000 established that persecution is understood as any harm or 
punishment for religious, political or other illegitimate reasons that “rises above the 
level of mere harassment,”117 In 2002 in changed its perspective adding that the 
illegitimacy of the reasons leading to the harm should be seen from the perspective of 
the US legal system.118 It is clear from reading such cases that courts have depended on 
the subjective notion of “offensiveness.” Such notion depends on the subjective 
assessment of every judge which is far away from the adoption of any objective model.  
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Many legal scholars have indicated the dangers behind adopting the subjective 
approach. For instance, Hathaway and Foster stipulate that following such an approach 
leads to devastating outcomes when it comes to gender-related persecution, as judges 
would depend on their cultural backgrounds in determining refugee status.119 They 
indicate many cases in which courts have rejected granting refugee status to 
homosexuals as they could have easily avoided persecution if they had managed to hide 
their sexuality or limit their sexual practices.120 In one of those cases decided by the 
Federal Court of Australia, a homosexual applicant was denied protection based on the 
same argument. The court state: “The evidence is that [the applicant] can avoid a real 
chance of serious harm simply by refraining from making his sexuality widely known 
- by not saying that he is homosexual and not engaging in public displays of affection 
towards other men. He will be able to function as a normal member of society if he does 
this.”121 Judges also have used the subjective approach to reject many women applicants 
claiming refugee status who based their applications on gender-based discrimination by 
justifying it according to the applicant’s culture or religion. For instance, in the Matter 
of Johnson, the immigration court denied the claim of a woman from Sierra Leone who 
left her country because she feared that her relatives would practice female genital 
mutilation (FGM) on her young daughters. The reasoning was shocking as the 
immigration judge stated that ‘while some cultures view female genital mutilation 
(FGM) as abhorrent and/or even barbaric, others do not.’122 Thus, in doing so the court 
depended in a more subjective approach which is the cultural background of the 
applicant, which –if widely used– would lead to devastating consequences.  
2. Choosing Human Rights as an Objective Standard for Interpreting the Refugee 
Convention 
It is clear that the subjective approach is very risky when it comes to determining 
refugee status. This is why many scholars and practitioners have asked for an objective 
and uniform standard to depend on while interpreting the terms of the Refugee 
Convention. The question pertaining here is whether international human rights law is 
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the appropriate standard to follow when interpreting the Refugee Convention or not. To 
answer this question going back to the general rules governing treaty interpretation set 
by the public international law is necessary. One of the main treaties governing the 
process of drafting, concluding and interpreting treaties is The Vienna Convention on 
the Law of Treaties (VCLT).123 This convention provides a guide for interpreting the 
1951 Refugee Convention. The main obstacle before this process is that, technically 
speaking, the Vienna Convention should not be applied in interpreting the Refugee 
Convention as the latter was drafted 18 years earlier, and Art. 4 of the Vienna 
Convention states,  
“Without prejudice to the application of any rules set forth in the present 
Convention to which treaties would be subject under international law 
independently of the Convention, the Convention applies only to treaties which 
are concluded by States after the entry into force of the present Convention with 
regard to such States.”124  
It is agreed upon between legal scholars and practitioners that the VCLT is part of 
customary international law, which means that it should be applied to all treaties and is 
binding to all states. This view was supported by the International Court of Justice (ICJ) 
in its decision in Territorial Dispute (Libyan Arab Jamahiriya/Chad), in which the 
court affirmed that in spite the treaty being concluded between the two countries in 
1955, it should be interpreted according to the rules set by the VCLT, which is part of 
customary international law.125 This stance was reaffirmed in Maritime Delimitation 
and Territorial Questions between Qatar and Bahrain, in which the court also indicated 
that the treaty between both countries should be interpreted according to the rules set 
by the VCLT.126 
The main article that governs the process of treaty interpretation is Art. 31 of the VCLT, 
which is entitled “General Rule of Interpretation.” It states that ‘[a] treaty shall be 
interpreted in good faith in accordance with the ordinary meaning to be given to the 
terms of the treaty in their context and in the light of its object and purpose.’127 
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Determining the context of the Refugee Convention is not an easy task to do, especially 
that we need to determine first the “object and purpose” of this convention. The 
dominant perspective among scholars is that the determination of the object and the 
purpose of any treaty can be done by referring to its preamble. This view has been 
supported by many courts working in the human rights field, such as, the European 
Court of Human Rights in Golder v. the United Kingdom, in which the court asserted 
that, “[A]s stated in Article 31 para. 2 of the Vienna Convention, the preamble to a 
treaty forms an integral part of the context. Furthermore, the preamble is generally 
very useful for the determination of the "object" and "purpose" of the instrument to be 
construed.”128 There have been many conflicting views regarding the object and 
purpose of the Refugee Convention. One of them sees the Convention’s aims as 
pursuing “a human rights inspired purpose.” The second perspective believes that the 
convention aims to protect individuals and that is a humanitarian purpose. Finally, there 
is a view that perceives the convention to resolve mutual problems between state 
parties.129 The most convincing approach for me is the one which perceives the 
convention to be inspired by the purpose of human rights and that is for many reasons. 
Taking the view of human rights, it is clear when we read the first two paragraphs of 
the 1951 Refugee Convention preamble that the drafters of the Convention explicitly 
expressed the importance of the protection of the rights and freedoms of all humans. 
They also referred to the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, which allows us to 
presume the importance of such legal instrument at this time, and how drafters were 
influenced by it. The preamble of the Refugee Convention highlights that, 
“CONSIDERING that the Charter of the United Nations and the Universal Declaration 
of Human Rights approved on 10 December 1948 by the General Assembly have 
affirmed the principle that human beings shall enjoy fundamental rights and freedoms 
without discrimination, 
CONSIDERING that the United Nations has, on various occasions, manifested its 
profound concern for refugees and endeavored to assure refugees the widest possible 
exercise of these fundamental rights and freedoms.”130 
Many national jurisdictions have adopted the human rights approach while interpreting 
the Refugee Convention. They depend on the same argument that the preamble provides 
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explicitly the importance of human rights and the instruments relating to it. For 
instance, the Refugee Review Tribunal in Australia in Applicant A and B v. Minister 
for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs has affirmed such approach by stating,  
“The appellants seek no more than the enforcement of Australia's domestic law. That 
law affords them certain rights if they can establish that they are "refugees" within the 
Convention definition. That definition is, in turn, to be understood as written against 
the background of international human rights law, including as reflected or expressed 
in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the International Covenant on Civil 
and Political Rights.”131 
It is clear from the court decision that the judges have drawn on the ICCPR in reaching 
a more consistent interpretation of the refugee definition. It is also clear that many 
courts and tribunals have relied on the ICESCR as both covenants enjoy wide 
membership by states. Many writers and commentators have also indicated the 
progressive amount of cases in which domestic courts have relied on international 
human rights instruments in interpreting the Refugee Convention.132 The courts have 
also explicitly highlighted in its guidelines many human rights conventions and 
covenants relating to the case at hand, even if the country has not signed or ratified.133 
The United Kingdom in its Gender Guidelines refers to the Convention on the 
Suppression of the Traffic in Persons and of the Exploitation of the Prostitution of 
Others. In spite of the UK not being a signatory state of it.134 Furthermore, the same 
guidelines refer to the Convention on Consent to Marriage and Minimum Age for 
Marriage and Registration of Marriages. Such a convention is only signed by 49 
states.135 In addition, Hathaway has acknowledged the use of the Convention on the 
Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women (‘CEDAW’) by many 
courts to establish to how extent the discrimination the applicant suffers amounts to 
persecution.136 
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C. Economic and Social Rights vs. Civil and Political Rights 
I have determined how the human rights approach is the best fit for serving the universal 
and objective standard for interpreting the refugee convention, especially the term 
‘persecution,’ by determining whether the violation of any right can amount to 
persecution or not. It is also important to recognize socio-economic rights and their role 
in the model of human rights and whether they fall at the same level in hierarchy as 
civil and political rights or are inferior to it. To do so, it is important to discuss two 
dominant models that determine how socio-economic rights violations can amount to 
persecution. The first approach was developed by Jean-Yves Carlier which is called 
“the three scales” or the “normative hierarchical approach” as Michelle Foster used to 
refer to it.137 The second approach is the “hierarchy of obligation” theory developed by 
James C. Hathaway. Both theories carry their own weight among legal scholars and 
practitioners but in my view the application of both of them is problematic.  
1. Jean-Yves Carlier’s Hierarchical Approach 
In the hierarchical approach, Carlier proposes that for decision makers to determine 
whether a person should be granted refugee status or not, they should answer one main 
question which is: whether there is a risk of persecution if the applicant returns to his 
or her country. To answer this question the decision maker which is the court or the 
UNHCR staff should break it into three sub-questions or “three scales”. Those questions 
are, at what point does the risk exists, at what point does persecution exist? “[And] at 
what point is the risk of persecution sufficiently established.”138 Those questions must 
be addressed in order to assess the refugee’s claim. The most important question for us 
here to answer is the second question pertaining the existence of persecution, as we 
need to know how Carlier can determine the level of violation that amounts to 
persecution. Carlier sees persecution as “the degree of breach of basic human rights 
amounting to persecution.”139 He distinguishes between civil and political rights and 
considers it in a higher position than the “quantitative and qualitative” severity of the 
violation does not matter. On the other hand, the economic, social and cultural rights 
violations should be very severe in order to consider them as a persecution, he states,  
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“The more fundamental the right in question is (right to life, physical integrity, freedom 
. . .), the less quantitatively and qualitatively severe the treatment need be. The lower 
the priority attributed to the violated freedom (economic, social or cultural rights), the 
more quantitatively and qualitatively severe the treatment must be.”140 
It is clear from the theory that Carlier puts civil and political rights in higher a position 
than economic, social and cultural rights. This approach has been rarely used by refugee 
courts and tribunals in an explicit way, however, it has been used more implicitly when 
they used to reject claims of an economic or social nature on the grounds that it the 
violation is not enough to amount to persecution.141 
2. Hathaway’s Core Obligation Approach 
Unlike Carlier, James Hathaway refuses to use the three scale normative approach, he 
invented a new model of hierarchy depends on states’ obligations in relation to different 
human rights instruments. He adopts another conceptual approach. As Foster call it 
“hierarchy of obligations.” This approach is complicated to a certain extent as it 
establishes a four-tier structure that when followed we can determine if the violation 
amounts to persecution or not, regardless of the type of right that has been violated.142  
Marouf and Anker give a simplified interpretation of the “hierarchy of obligations” 
theory and its four tiers. The first tier is the rights stated in the UDHR and explicitly 
mentioned in the ICCPR as binding with no derogation permitted; the violations to any 
of those rights should automatically constitute persecution. The second tier includes the 
same rights as those in the first tier but with derogation permitted in the case of public 
emergency. In this case, if it is proven that there was no actual connection to an 
emergency or the state was abusing its powers, then those violations amount to 
persecution. The third tier comprises those rights in the UDHR and codified in the 
ICESCR. The violation of those rights amount to persecution if “the state ignores these 
interests despite the fiscal ability to respond,” or if the violations are grave and extreme 
enough that they results in the deprivation of life or cruel, inhumane and degrading 
treatment. The fourth tier includes those rights in the UDHR that are not codified in the 
ICCPR or ICESCR. The violation of those rights cannot be considered as 
persecution.143 
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In Hathaway’s approach it is clear that he puts the economic and social rights in the 
third category inferior to civil and political rights. This approach has been prominently 
accepted by most of the courts in the United Kingdom, Canada and New Zealand, as 
judges have repeatedly and explicitly manifested this theory in their judgments of 
various cases while determining whether any violation to a human right amounts to 
persecution. There is a clear difference between this model and the theory of Carlier 
explained above. The first deals with the violation of rights from the perspective of the 
‘nature of state obligation’ towards those rights, while the second, deals with the 
hierarchy of rights as if there is a “normative priority” to some of them over the 
other.144   
It is clear that both Carlier and Hathaway’s approaches categorize economic and social 
rights as inferior to civil and political rights. This is the same approach that most 
common law courts have adopted in the determination of refugee status. I reject both 
approaches as I believe that economic and social rights should be at the same level as 
civil and political rights when it comes to refugee status determination. I do also believe 
that claims of refugee status are more complex than determining it according to a fixed 
model of hierarchies. As the applicant is likely to have mixed fears of persecution that 
can be connected to different conventional grounds. Those fears can reflict some 
political rights violations that automatically affect him financially. For instance, the 
applicant may have his properties confiscated by the government for expressing his 
political opinion, so his right to free speech is violated as well as his right to property 
and shelter. In the next chapter, I will speak more about economic and social rights 
violations and to what extent they can be considered persecution under the Refugee 
Convention with examples from the precedents of some refugee courts and tribunals. 
Moreover, I would establish a connection between economic deprivation and the 
Refugee Conventional Grounds according to recent development in both literature and 
judicial practices in order to close the chain of refugee status determination.   
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V- Socio-Economic Claims under International Refugee Law 
This chapter, challenges both Carlier’s and Hathaway’s hierarchal approaches with new 
developments in the field of international human rights law and state practices. I 
elaborate on some economic and social rights and to see to what extent their violations 
can amount to persecution. Finally, I establish a connection between economic 
deprivation and the different refugee conventional grounds under a more developed 
understanding of refugee law with a focus on the fifth ground the applicant’s 
membership to a particular social group. 
A. The History of the adoption of the Hierarchal Approach 
The adoption of a hierarchal approach has been very popular among scholars and legal 
practitioners since the implementation of both the ICCPR and the ICESCR by most of 
the states around the world. There is a historic distinction between both categories of 
rights which was started during the Cold War and after the rights articulated by the 
UDHR were divided into two categories of rights. The first group related to the ICCPR 
which was supported by the North and the West and the ICESCR which was supported 
by the East and the South. Afterwards, many writers from the states supporting the first 
category have been discussing which category of rights should prevail over the other, 
and whether there is a hierarchy between both categories. They also have discussed 
whether certain rights should be given more attention and importance over the others. 
Those writers argue that civil and political rights should be on a higher level. They refer 
to civil and political rights as the “first generation of rights,” while socio-economic 
rights are inferior to them and referred to as the “second generation rights.”  
Arguments have been raised to justify this categorization of rights and their hierarchies. 
One contends that civil and political rights are liberal by nature as they only impose 
negative obligations on the state. Furthermore, states should refrain from any actions 
that violate these rights or reduce their benefit to the people. On the other hand, 
economic and social rights are by nature positive rights, which require states to take 
positive actions to assure their implementation. For some, civil and political rights do 
not require state expenditures as they only require the state to refrain from violating 
them. Unlike economic and social rights, they demand enormous expenditure as they 
are positive rights that require positive actions by the state to be implemented. Finally, 
some writers argue that civil and political rights are justiciable, which means that any 
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violations of them can be easily challenged in courts, while economic and social rights 
are not justiciable due to their complex nature requiring judges to do extensive 
economic research to prove that states have not fulfilled their duties under international 
human rights law. All of those arguments are in the process of being challenged in 
modern literature. In the next section various perspectives of literature that tackle such 
arguments will be presented.  
B. Challenging the Legitimacy of Putting Rights into a Hierarchy  
There are strong challenges to the arguments of categorizing rights into distinct levels 
of hierarchy. Throughout the past few decades many scholars and treaty bodies’ 
practices and guidelines have challenged the dominant view that civil and political rights 
are negative rights that only require state to refrain from taking actions that violates 
them, while economic and social rights are naturally positive rights that require states to 
carry out actions to implement them. Reading the preambles and the articles of both 
covenants we can easily say that for a state to implement such provisions, there should 
be both negative and positive actions taken from its side. This is also clear when we 
examine the Human Rights Council’s General Comments regarding the implementation 
of the ICCPR. In General Comment 31 regarding legal obligation under article 2, para. 
1, the HRC stresses the point that  respecting all rights requires positive actions on 
the state’s side to insure their implementation. It states that, “the legal obligation under 
article 2, paragraph 1, is both negative and positive in nature.”145 
Moreover, in General Comments regarding some civil rights such as the right to life, 
the HRC has stressed that respecting such rights requires positive actions to be taken 
by the state. It states that, “the Committee has noted that the right to life has been too 
often narrowly interpreted. The expression (inherent right to life) cannot properly be 
understood in a restrictive manner, and the protection of this right requires that States 
adopt positive measures.”146 The same approach has been taken towards the prohibition 
of torture and cruel treatment or punishment. General Comment 20 posits that, “It is the 
duty of the State party to afford everyone protection through legislative and other 
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measures as may be necessary against the acts prohibited by article 7.”147 We can see 
also General Comments regarding the right to a fair trial and public hearing,148 the right 
to vote,149 right to equality between women and men;150 in all of the general comments 
published by the HRC, we can find stress on the positive actions required by the state 
to implement those rights.151 Finally, the HRC has articulated it explicitly concerning 
the interpretation of art. 24 of the ICCPR regarding the rights of the child. It states,  
[…] every possible economic and social measure should be taken to reduce 
infant mortality and to eradicate malnutrition among children and to prevent 
them from being subjected to acts of violence and cruel and inhuman treatment 
or from being exploited by means of forced labor or prostitution, or by their use 
in the illicit trafficking of narcotic drugs, or by any other means.152 
On the other hand, the economic and social rights stipulated by the ICESCR require 
states to take some negative actions by refraining to intervene in the implementation of 
some of those rights, such as the right to join trade unions and the prohibition of 
discrimination in the application of all economic and social rights. The UN Committee 
on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (CESCR) has stipulated in many of its general 
comments on the rights adopted by the ICESCR that states should refrain from 
interfering directly or indirectly in the enjoyment of such rights, such as the right to 
water.153 That is also seen in other general comments regarding the rights to education, 
housing, health and food.154  
This leads us to the second argument which states that economic and social rights are 
more aspirational than rights as they require gross government expenditure unlike the 
civil and political rights which do not affect national income and expenditure. The first 
response to such an argument is discussed in the last section categorizing rights into 
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negative and positive rights, and how this should be regarded as a misconception. 
Moreover, some writers have indicated that civil and political rights cost states 
enormous levels of expenditure annually in order to be fulfilled. For instance the right 
to a free trial requires the state to spend huge amounts of money to guarantee the 
efficiency of its judicial bodies. Furthermore, the right to vote requires the state to spend 
enormous amounts of money to guarantee free and transparent elections. Paul Hunt in 
his book, Reclaiming Social Rights: International and Comparative Perspectives, takes 
New Zealand as an example. He paints a vivid picture of the spending by the New 
Zeeland government to maintain and protect civil and political rights.155 
Finally, there has been a strong argument among scholars that civil and political rights 
are justiciable unlike socio-economic rights. The debate of “justiciability” has received 
considerable attention from legal scholars and practitioners in the last few decades.156 
E.W.Vierdag for instance has argued that the implementation of economic and social 
rights requires policy choices by the government; such choices and decisions are 
beyond the jurisdiction of the judiciary as judges would be interfering in the work of 
the executive authority if they are given the ability to decide on those matters.157 
Furthermore, there have been many arguments that economic and social rights are 
vague and their violation is difficult to identify, as judges are not be capable of 
determining the state obligations regarding the implementation of the Covenant.158 
These arguments have been made by many writers for the past few decades, and they 
have become increasingly invalid according to recent developments in the field of 
international human rights law. For instance, the UN Economic Committee has 
identified in many of its general comments, “the minimum core obligation,” which 
determines the minimum effort each state should exert in order to maintain economic 
and social rights, otherwise, it is responsible for committing violations against its 
people. Moreover, the UN General Assembly has recently adopted the Optional 
Protocol to the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (OP-
ICESCR) which is similar to the optional protocol adopted for the ICCPR. It allows 
victims of economic and social rights violations to present their claims on the 
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international level if they are unable or unwilling to access their countries’ judicial 
path.159   
In response to this ongoing debate concerning which category of rights should prevail 
over the other, I reject the concept of placing rights into hierarchies by putting economic 
and social rights in a place that is inferior to civil and political rights. There have been 
many arguments made which justify such an approach although they have been 
challenged by many legal critics and reflected in judicial decisions which stipulate that 
all rights should be on the same level of importance. The Vienna Declaration and 
Programme of Action, which was approved by more than 170 countries, states that:  
All human rights are universal, indivisible and interdependent and interrelated. 
The international community must treat human rights globally in a fair and 
equal manner, on the same footing, and with the same emphasis. While the 
significance of national and regional particularities and various historical, 
cultural and religious backgrounds must be borne in mind, it is the duty of 
States, regardless of their political, economic and cultural systems, to promote 
and protect all human rights and fundamental freedoms.160 
All rights shall be on the same level of importance; there should not be any hierarchy 
among rights. This point of view has been adopted by many scholars and legal 
practitioners in the last few decades and has been supported by the general comments 
of treaty bodies such as the Human Right Committee and the UN Committee on 
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, as I mentioned before.  
C. Challenging the Applicability of Recognizing Socio-Economic Claims for 
Refugee Status 
As I have discussed in the last three chapters, there has been a huge debate between 
legal scholars and courts around how to assess claims of an economic nature under the 
Refugee Convention. Some of those scholars have tended to follow a more expansive 
approach by adopting international human rights law as a framework for interpreting 
the Refugee Convention and I stand with this argument. However, other scholars have 
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preferred to adopt a more restrictive perspective and reject the recognition of economic 
and social rights violation as claims for refugee status.  
Those who argue for a more restrictive approach to economic claims have mainly 
adopted three arguments. Those arguments have been advanced by and cogently 
addressed by David Martin one of the leading refugee law scholars in the US, who has 
also joined in drafting many laws related to immigration and refugee policy in the US. 
Firstly, Martin argues that the main purpose of the Refugee Convention is ‘to assign a 
scarce resource, namely, asylum.’ Asylum in itself should not respond to need in social 
and economic rights perspective, because the applicant’s country is commonly 
receiving relief and development aid, therefore, we should not ask countries which are 
providing economic aid to other countries to also spend on their citizens seeking asylum 
for economic purposes. However, if the country of origin refuses to receive aid from 
other developed countries, in this case, we should consider that decision as a kind of 
resistance and therefore in that instance this action is of a political nature. So the 
applicant’s claim will be considered on political grounds and not on a social and 
economic basis.161 In contrast to this view, Goodwin-Gill and McAdam identify the 
purpose of the Refugee Convention from the preamble of the Universal Declaration for 
Human Rights in order to achieve the widest exercise of rights and freedoms, setting 
aside Martin’s argument of economic relief and assistance.162  
Secondly, Martin contends that “the institution of asylum is not coterminous with 
human rights policy.”163  He further argues that the refugee convention is not “to 
express sympathy, to note human rights abuses whenever they appear, or to register 
disapproval of a practice.”164 He believes that IRL should not encourage individuals to 
escape their countries; on the contrary, they should witness, share and join the 
communal struggles of their home countries.165 Kate Jastram seems to agree with 
Martin in some points and disagree on others. Jastram argues that it is not realistic to 
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believe that IRL should cover all human rights violations; it is not one of its core 
essentials. However, she believes that adopting Martin’s concept would lead to 
devastating consequences for refugees; as they will have an obligation not only to prove 
that they are not abusing the asylum system, but also to play a ‘heroic’ role and prove 
they are not putting their own interest above their countries’ interests selfishly. 166 
The third argument Martin raises is that asylum is a scarce political resource and that 
expanding economic claims will negatively affect it. He argues that asylum is a political 
tool, which has limits of protection; therefore lowering the threshold to include 
economic claims would take many numbers at the expense of those who have real ‘civil 
and political’ claims and in need of protection.167 McAdam on the other hand seems to 
disagree; he sees those restrictive interpretations as Martins’ are invalid. He believes 
that excluding some groups from protection will not eliminate those groups; otherwise, 
it will simply create new categories of unprotected persons.168 Kate Jastram also agrees 
with McAdam at this point.169 Thus we can clearly see that some commentators such 
as Martin has been trying to provide various arguments to demolish the idea of 
recognizing socio-economic claims as eligible for refugee status. 
D. Economic and Social Rights Violations as Persecution 
The important question that arises now after proving that all rights are equal is whether 
violations to economic and social rights amount to persecution or not, and if yes, 
whether there are any judicial practices regarding this implementation. After going 
through the literature related to international refugee law and socio-economic rights, 
and after examining various court decisions issued from many high courts around the 
world, I confidently respond affirmatively to both questions. In the next part, I would 
elaborate on socio-economic rights and their relation to persecution focusing on two 
main rights which are: the right to education and the right to health. Both rights have 
been extensively discussed by many national courts and by the UNHCR in its most 
recent guidelines regarding refugee status determination. 
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1. The Right to Education and Persecution  
There are many provisions in international law instruments that recognize and 
implement the right to education at different educational levels. The two main 
provisions that broadly elaborate on this right is the ICESCR in Art. 13 and the CRC in 
art. 28. Both provisions state using similar terms that the right of education should be 
granted to all people at different stages of education without discrimination. They also 
state that at the primary level of education, it shall be compulsory and available free to 
all,”170 while for the secondary education it “shall be made generally available and 
accessible to all by every appropriate means, and in particular by the progressive 
introduction of free education.”171 Finally, at the higher education level it, “shall be 
made accessible to all, on the basis of capacity, by every appropriate means, and in 
particular by the progressive introduction of free education.”172 The (CESCR) 
committee has stressed in many of its general comments the vital importance of the 
right to education and its relation to human dignity and the “development of human 
personality.” It considers such a right as one of the “minimum core obligations” that 
every state should abide by.173 The committee in the very beginning of its general 
comment no. 13 clearly states:  
Education is both a human right in itself and an indispensable means of realizing 
other human rights. As an empowerment right, education is the primary vehicle 
by which economically and socially marginalized adults and children can lift 
themselves out of poverty and obtain the means to participate fully in their 
communities. Education has a vital role in empowering women, safeguarding 
children from exploitative and hazardous labor and sexual exploitation, 
promoting human rights and democracy, protecting the environment, and 
controlling population growth. Increasingly, education is recognized as one of 
the best financial investments States can make. But the importance of education 
is not just practical: a well-educated, enlightened and active mind, able to 
wander freely and widely, is one of the joys and rewards of human existence.174 
After recent developments in the field of human rights law, the vital necessity of the 
right to education has become obvious at all levels. That is due to the considerably 
                                                             
170 UN General Assembly, International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, 16 
December 1966, United Nations, Treaty Series, vol. 993, p. 3, art. 28 (1)(a); see also, UN General 
Assembly, Convention on the Rights of the Child, 20 November 1989, United Nations, Treaty Series, 
vol. 1577, p. 3, art. 28 (1) (a). 
171 Ibid, ICESCR, art. 13 (2) (b). 
172 Ibid, ICESCR, art. 13 (2) (c). 
173 UN Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (CESCR), General Comment No. 11: 
Plans of Action for Primary Education (Art. 14 of the Covenant), 10 May 1999, E/1992/23, para. 2. 
174 Supra note 154, para. 1. 
52 
amount of work carried out by human rights groups and activists around the world show 
how children globally suffer from the violation of the right to education. Most children 
are prohibited from going to school and in most cases there is a discriminatory factor 
related to this prohibition. For instance, Human Rights Watch has indicated in its report, 
Failing Our Children: Barriers to the Right to Education that “[All over the world] that 
children suffer discrimination in gaining access to education, based on their race, 
ethnicity, religion, or other status.”175 It also indicates in another report how girls are 
more commonly excluded from the process of education than boys at early age, 
especially if one of their family members is ill. For example, in case of Kenya where 
AIDs is a widespread disease, only 6 percent of the girls reach grade five of primary 
education.176  
Many court decisions also show that many children experience bullying at school at a 
very early age for many reasons including their religion, ethnicity and color. For 
instance, in one of the cases presented before the Refugee Review Tribunal of Australia 
(RRT), a Sabean Mandaean child from Iran who belongs to a minority religious group, 
testified being excessively bullied by his fellow Muslim colleagues and teachers at 
school, who tried to convert him to Islam. He also testified that Muslim men and 
children tried to avoid touching him or sharing food with him, as he is regarded to be 
less clean than other children from other religious backgrounds. The Tribunal in this 
case agreed that those acts of bullying based on grave discrimination against people 
from the child’s religious group should be regarded as acts of persecution against him, 
as it would hinder him from finishing primary school and would have a serious 
psychological impact on him.177 Another judgement from the same Tribunal argued that 
the “[d]iscriminatory denial of access to primary education is such a denial of a 
fundamental human right that it amounts to persecution.”178 
There is another well-known example of a court decisions based on the asylum-seeker’s 
membership of a particular social group. The Refugee Protection Division (RPD) of the 
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Immigration and Refugee Board of Canada (IRB) ruled in one of its cases that a gypsy 
girl from Hungary, who had been bullied at school by her colleagues and her teachers 
recognized that her chances of finishing her primary school education were “greatly 
diminished” because of the discriminatory practices she was subjected to. They 
explained that in this case the prevention of education was based on discrimination 
against her on the ground of her membership to “a particular social group” amounting 
to persecution, so the girl was recognized to be a refugee.179 
There is no question that after the most recent developments in the field of economic 
and social rights, the violation or denial of the right to education amounts to persecution 
in the sense of international refugee law and the determination of refugee status. This 
view was supported by UNHCR in its guidelines: “It is only in certain circumstances 
that discrimination will amount to persecution. This would be so if measures of 
discrimination lead to consequences of a substantially prejudicial nature for the person 
concerned, e.g. serious restrictions on his right to earn his livelihood, his right to 
practice his religion, or his access to normally available educational facilities.”180 It 
also indicates in its guidelines regarding gender-based persecution the same: 
discrimination against women when it reaches the level of their prevention from 
education amount to persecution.181 The same approach has been followed by many 
states and is reflected in those states’ guidelines regarding the refugee status 
determination process (RSD). It established that the violation of the right to education 
should be considered as an unbearable act of ill-treatment especially when it is 
perpetrated in a discriminatory manner, thereby constituting persecution.182 
2. The Right to Health and Persecution 
One of the most important economic and social rights is the right to health. It intersects 
with many other rights like the right to education, the right to water and the right to 
food. As indicated in chapters two and three the world has long witnessed high rates of 
poverty, the declining status of health care seen in the increasing number of deaths 
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resulting from serious and sometimes non-serious infection. Those deaths could have 
been avoided if governments had provided better health care for its citizens. The right 
to health was stated explicitly in Art. 12 of the ICESCR, Art. 25 of the UDHR, Art. 5 
of the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial 
Discrimination, art. 11 and 12 of the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of 
Discrimination against Women and art. 24 of the Convention on the Rights of the Child. 
As the CESCR has established in General Comment no. 14 regarding the right to health: 
“Health is a fundamental human right indispensable for the exercise of other human 
rights. Every human being is entitled to the enjoyment of the highest attainable standard 
of health conducive to living a life in dignity.”183 Similar to the right to education, the 
economic committee confirmed that with regard to the right to health, states have a 
“core obligation” to enjoy the satisfaction of such right, by providing the minimum 
essential levels of health care to its citizens.184 It places core obligations on every state 
including “ensur[ing] the right of access to health facilities, goods and services on a 
non-discriminatory basis, especially for vulnerable or marginalized groups.”185 
Many refugee courts and tribunals have relied on the “minimum core obligations” set 
by the ICESCR to grant asylum-seekers refugee status based on the violation of their 
right to health. For instance, in the previously mentioned court decision issued by the 
Refugee Review Tribunal of Australia (RRT) concerning a Sabean Mandaean child 
from Iran who belongs to a religious minority group. The court found that such a group 
also faced persecution regarding lack of proper medical treatment, as doctors and nurses 
abstained from helping them because of their “alleged uncleanliness.”186 This point was 
also made by some US courts regarding people with disabilities from Burkina Faso. 
Some courts have established that disabled persons are subject to a severe violation of 
their right to health amounting to persecution.187  
After reviewing many courts decisions and scholarly writing, it is clear that the right to 
health is gaining increasing attention from legal scholars and practitioners. As a result, 
most courts have started to recognize the denial of medical treatment in most cases to 
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be life-threatening, and in itself sufficient to amount to persecution rendering the victim 
eligible for refugee status. As the RRT has proposed, “[d]enial of access to medical 
facilities of itself is such a denial of fundamental human rights that it amounts to 
persecution.”188 One of the most successful recent claims affirmed by courts in the US, 
Canada and Australia, are those claims related to applicants with HIV disease from 
Africa. They consider patients with such a disease in many African countries as being 
subject to social stigma and ostracism, commonly practiced by family members and 
friends. In the US, for instance, an immigration judge ruled that poor ill persons from 
Mali are more exposed to persecution as they are not be able to spend money for 
medical treatment. He stated that “country conditions indicated that only individuals 
with wealth and large sums of money can access treatment and avoid stigmatization.”189 
Adding to the right to education, is the right to food. Recent court and human rights 
commissions’ decisions have been paying greater attention to the right to food and how 
countries violating this right lead to devastating outcomes towards their people. In 
SERAC and CESR Versus Nigeria the African Commission on Human and Peoples’ 
Rights issued its well-known decision which condemned the actions of the Nigerian 
state toward Ogoni communities, who were seen as political opponents to the 
government. Those communities have been subjected to discrimination based on 
imputed political opinion. As a result, the government confiscated their lands to exploit 
for oil. The Commission found that the destruction of Ogoni farmlands, rivers, crops 
and animals had created “malnutrition and starvation among certain Ogoni 
communities,” which the Commission viewed as a massive violation of the rights of 
health and food that amounted to persecution.190  
It is clear after examining recent case laws and scholarly writings that recent human 
rights developments have directly impacted the field of international refugee law; 
scholars have increasingly started to adopt international human rights law as the most 
appropriate framework to work from when it comes to having a more objective and 
universal application of the Refugee Convention and a more accurate interpretation of 
its terms. As a result, economic and social rights have been recognized by legal 
practitioners and scholars to be on the same level with civil and political rights. This is 
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after the historical tradition adopting a hierarchal approach towards rights, which 
recognize economic and social rights to be inferior to other rights. Furthermore, court 
practices reflect an evolution in judges’ understanding of the severity of economic and 
social rights violations and the impact of them on people’s lives which could be more 
devastating than the violations of civil and political rights. This new understanding is 
reflected in many of their most recent judgements regarding the violation of the right 
to education, health, water and food amounting to persecution under the Refugee 
Convection.  
E. Connecting Economic Deprivation to the Refugee Conventional Grounds 
As I have previously discussed in this chapter, recent developments in the field of 
international refugee law are considered to a new understanding of the concept of 
persecution depending on other developments in international human rights law. 
Economic and social right violations have been considered by many refugee courts and 
tribunals to amount to persecution under the Refugee Convention. It is now important 
to close the chain and elaborate on the last element by establishing the connection “the 
causal link” between the applicants’ fear of persecution and the five conventional 
grounds mentioned in the Refugee Convention, which is essential for any applicant to 
be recognized as a refugee. 
The conventional grounds mentioned in the 1951 Refugee Convention is the last 
element in determining refugee status. Applicants fear economic deprivation that 
amounts to persecution must establish that this depravation was or will be imposed on 
them because of their race, nationality, religion, political opinion or membership in a 
particular social group. I previously elaborated on several court decisions that 
established a clear connection between economic deprivation or social rights violations 
and the race, religion and political opinion such as: the Sabean Mandaean in Iran who 
were found eligible for refugee status as they are socially persecuted for their religion. 
Furthermore, the Ogoni communities in Nigeria who are economically persecuted for 
their race and political opinion for opposing their government. The ground of 
nationality has been used rarely in refugee claims and this applies also to persecution 
based on civil and political rights violations as well.  
In this section, I focus on the fifth and last ground which is membership in a particular 
social group (MPSG) because most recent developments in the field of international 
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refugee law are based on this ground.191 The MPSG ground has proven to be very 
successful in including new types of refugee claims in the last few decades. Unlike 
other conventional grounds, this ground has effectively expanded the convention’s 
interpretation to protect new groups of people who were not previously considered by 
courts. It has also been previously used by many writers and courts to recognize gender-
based persecution and consider different groups like women living in specific 
patriarchal societies, and members of the LGBT communities persecuted for their 
sexual orientation in different countries around the world.192 
Interpreting the MPSG ground has been one of the most controversial topics in the field 
of international refugee law in the last two decades; many writers have excessively 
discussed the proper interpretation of this ground.193 This controversy even has 
extended to reach the UNHCR and as noted in its recent guidelines, it has also raised a 
debate between courts in different legal systems.194 In the last few years, there has been 
one approach that has dominated, which is the protected characteristics approach 
“ejusdem generis.” This approach was first articulated by the US Board of Immigration 
Appeals (BIA) in the Matter of Acosta,195 and has also been adopted by many courts in 
Canada, New Zealand and the UK.196 Applying this approach to the Refugee 
Convection, the BIA has ruled that,  
Persecution that is directed toward an individual who is a member of a group of persons 
all of whom share a common, immutable characteristic. The shared characteristic might 
be an innate one such as sex, color or kinship ties, or in some circumstances it might be 
a shared past experience such as former military leadership or land ownership . . . 
Whatever the common characteristic that defines the group, it must be one that the 
members of the group either cannot change, or should not be required to change 
because it is fundamental to their individual identities or conscience.197 
The UNHCR has followed the same approach towards defining the MPSG ground It 
states in the Summary Conclusions that: “A particular social group is a group of persons 
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who share a common characteristic other than their risk of being persecuted, and which 
sets them apart. The characteristic will ordinarily be one which is innate, 
unchangeable, or which is otherwise fundamental to human dignity.”198 Accordingly, 
many courts following such approach have been able to identify new social groups 
based on their economic conditions or social background. In the next section, I will 
elaborate more on recent developments in judicial practices by which courts have 
identified new social groups with a more on economic class and occupation. 
1. Economic Class as a Particular Social Group  
In this part, I will discuss whether economic deprivation can generate new social groups 
under the recent common interpretation of the MPSG ground under the Refugee 
Convention. In the last two decades courts have had conflicting views regarding 
whether to recognize economic class and poverty as a PSGs or not -in other words- 
whether being part of a certain economic class or being poor and economically 
impoverished are innate and immutable characteristics or not. On the one hand, we can 
see many Canadian decisions including the Federal Court of Appeal (FCA), which has 
held that “the poor” can be considered as a distinctive social group under the Refugee 
Convention. In Sinora v. Minister of Employment and Immigration, the applicant 
claimed refugee status based on his membership of a particular social group “the poor 
in Haiti.”199 The court indicated that poor people in Haiti are indeed considered to be a 
PSG and granted the applicant the refugee status under this ground.200 Moreover, many 
decision-makers in many jurisdictions have considered applicants’ claims from the 
Midgan caste in Somalia. For instance, in a recent decision, New Zealand RSAA has 
recognized such claim and determined that applicants from such caste are always 
economically impoverished compared to members of other clans as they are “often kept 
as slaves by other clans.”201 
Furthermore, in UNN (RE), the RPD determined refugee status for a Colombian 
applicant for being poor. The court indicated that the applicant was targeted and 
discriminated against because of his race and his socio-economic status, which makes 
people like him more subject to murder or torture by gangs. The court concluded in its 
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decision that: “Street children, poor young black men, and other ‘undesirables’ are 
common targets. […] I find that the claimant suffered from discrimination amounting 
to persecution because of his race and socio-economic group.”202 Canadian courts have 
also considered new groups to fall under the same ground. For instance, “poor 
compesinos in El Salvador”203 and “impoverished young women from the former 
Soviet Union recruited for exploitation in the international sex trade.”204 
Moreover, in the UK the Immigration Appeal Tribunal (IAT) in Ogbeide v. Secretary 
of State for the Home Department in which the applicant a Nigerian girl was subjected 
to human trafficking, has indicated that “young girls from Nigeria whose economic 
circumstances are poor” are considered a PSG.205 In the US also, the Newark Asylum 
Office has indicated in many of its decisions that “low-income individuals with HIV” 
are considered a PSG.206 It is clear from the previous decisions that many courts have 
used the “protected characteristics” approach to extend the Refugee Convention’s scope 
of protection by including new groups which were never considered or protected.  
On the other hand, we can find many other decisions which reject claims for refugee 
status based on economic deprivation. They indicate that poor economic class may not 
be recognized as PSG. These decisions were mainly based on the lack of the 
immutability condition under the protected characteristics test.  In UKS (Re), the 
Refugee Protection Division (RPD) of the Immigration and Refugee Board of Canada 
(IRB) has rejected the application of a Salvadorian applicant who claimed that he was 
persecuted in his country for being a young poor male returning from the US. The RPD 
indicated that: “being a male is innate, and being young is not changeable other than by 
the natural ageing process. Being poor, however, is neither innate nor 
unchangeable.”207 The Board has also rejected another application of a Jamaican 
woman who claimed that she was persecuted and targeted by criminals in her country 
for being poor, and based its decision on the same argument that poverty is a changeable 
characteristic.208 Furthermore, the New Zealand Refugee Status Appeals Authority 
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(RSAA) asserted in one of its decisions that: “poverty per se is not immutable, nor is it 
so fundamental to the identity of the members that they ought not to be required to 
change it.”209 
After reading those cases which dismiss “the poor” from being recognized as a PSG, it 
is clear that these decisions were grounded in an unrealistic assessment of the reasons 
behind poverty and economic disadvantage and that is for two main reasons: firstly, in 
none of those cases did the court assess the situation of the poor applicant in his or her 
country in order to reach the conclusion that his poverty was changeable and not 
immutable. Secondly, judges in their decisions have had a wrong presumption that 
poverty is a changeable characteristic, which is very unrealistic as according to the 
world’s current situation of poverty, which I discussed in the second chapter, it is clear 
that the poverty rate in most developing countries continues to rise and the economic 
conditions of the people are getting worse not vice versa.  
2. Occupation as a Particular Social Group 
In this section, I discuss whether people who share a common occupation can qualify 
to a PSG under the understanding of the Refugee Convention according to recent 
developments in literature and case law. It is important to reflect on occupation namely 
as practical experience in the field has proved that many oppressive regimes have been 
targeting people with certain occupation for various reasons. For example, their 
occupation can be seen against the dominant religion of the country such as people 
working on women’s rights field. Other people can be persecuted as their occupation is 
regarded as a political tool for opposing the ruling regime like people working in the 
human rights field. Many writers have indicated the hardship of connecting occupation 
to the ground of MPSG, as in many cases such claims have failed to pass the 
“immutable characteristic” test and that was clear in many court decisions.210 However, 
recent case law has proven the courts’ have become more willing to consider such group 
as a PSG.  
Many writers such as Hathaway, Foster, Daley and Kelley have indicated that one’s 
fear of being persecuted for the reasons of his/her employment or occupation is 
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protected under the Refugee Convention.211 By applying the “immutable characteristic” 
approach, we can establish that since freedom of employment is a basic right according 
to art. 6 of the ICESCR and art 23 of the UDHR, people who are persecuted for their 
occupation or are forced to leave or change their occupation should be considered as a 
PSG. Many courts have considered many claims which has depend on occupation as a 
social group. For instance: in the case of R v. Secretary of State for the Home 
Department, ex parte Ouanes, the applicant who is an Algerian woman working as a 
midwife for the government claimed that she has a well-founded fear of being 
persecuted by fundamentalists for providing advice to women regarding contraception. 
She also claimed that the Algerian government was unable and unwilling to protect her 
from these fundamentalists who impose threats to her life.212 The UK Court of Appeal 
ruled in favor of the applicant granting her asylum as it considered midwives working 
in Algeria as a PSG and eligible for refugee status under the Refugee Convention. The 
court stated in its judgement that: “[T]he characteristic that defines the social group 
must, in situations such as the present, be one that the members should not be required 
to change because it is fundamental to their individual identities or conscience.”213 
Furthermore, in Nouredine v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs the 
applicant who was an Algerian woman working in beauty industry claimed that she has 
been persecuted by Muslim extremists for her work, as they see it as an immoral 
industry that should be eliminated which imposed threats on her life.214 The Australian 
Federal Court of Refugees (FCR) held that the applicant is eligible for refugee status 
and considered beauty workers in Algeria as a PSG who deserve protection under the 
Refugee Convention.215 
On the other hand, in Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs v Zamora the 
Australian Federal Court of Refugees (FCR), rejected the claim of an Ecuadorian man 
who claimed that his occupation as a tour guide made him part of a PSG. The court 
noted that: “Quite apart from the risk of using persecution or the fear of persecution as 
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a defining feature, in many cases an occupational group will not satisfy the requirement 
that it be recognized within the society as a group, even though it may fairly be said 
that the members of an occupational group have common characteristics not shared by 
their society.”216 Furthermore, in Matter of Acosta, the BIA held that a group of taxi 
drivers did not qualify the ground of PSG as they did not meet the immutable and 
protected characteristics. It states that: “the members of the group [the taxi cooperative] 
could avoid the threats of the guerillas either by changing jobs or by cooperating in 
work stoppages.”217 
It is clear after reading previous cases that some courts have started to recognize 
occupation as a PSG, however that is not the case with other courts which continuingly 
rejected similar claims based on the argument that occupation is not immutable and that 
the claimant could have easily relinquished his or her occupation in order to avoid 
persecution. I disagree with the latter argument for two reasons: firstly, courts by 
adopting such an approach strictly, dismiss the fact that changing occupation puts much 
hardship on the applicant, as he/she may have lived his whole life doing that job; and 
presuming that he can easily shift from one occupation to another is unreasonable and 
would put the applicant on higher risk of economic deprivation. Secondly, requiring the 
applicant to leave his or her occupation conflicts with his basic right to work and 
freedom of employment which would amount to a violation of his social and economic 
rights. 
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VI – Conclusion 
As many regional refugee courts have started to recognize many asylum claims based 
on economic and social deprivation in the last two decades, there is still no consensus 
between them regarding the validity of such claims under the interpretation of the 
Refugee Convention. Some legal scholars and practitioners have realized how 
international human rights law is the most suitable framework to provide a proper 
interpretation for the Convention, as it contains the objective and universal principles 
decision makers can use to determine refugee status for asylum-seekers. This approach 
has produced many new developments in the field of international refugee law. Gender-
based violence is now regarded as persecution by most regional courts and even noted 
by the UNHCR in its guidelines.  
Nevertheless, claims based on economic and social deprivation are more complex and 
are harder to be recognized for many reasons. First, the recognition of these claims 
challenges the traditional dichotomy set between economic migrants and genuine 
political refugees. Such a dichotomy has always been used by academic writers and 
courts since the drafting of the Refugee Convention in 1951. Second, the approach 
raises many security and financial complications for states as most people now regarded 
as “irregular migrants” would be recognized as refugees and this places a legal 
obligation on these states to give them safe entry and protection. Third, economic and 
social rights have always been categorized and seen as inferior to civil and political 
rights for many reasons such as: the former being positive rights that require states to 
allocate expenditures to protect them; however the latter are negative rights that only 
require states to abstain from taking any action that might violate them. Moreover, civil 
and political violations are justiciable as they can be easily contested before courts. This 
is unlike economic and social rights violations that in order to be contested judges 
requires to evaluate the performance of the executive authority to protect these rights, 
which is not their duty to do so and goes against the principle of the separation between 
authorities.   
This paper contests the traditional perspective of categorizing rights which promote the 
prevalence of some rights over others. It argues that recent developments in the 
international human rights law field show the invalidity of this categorization as many 
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states and human rights tribunals have started to realize that all rights are 
interconnected; any violation of one right also results in the violation of other rights.  
 
